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FAILED BOUNDARIES: THE NEAR-PERFECT
CORRELATION BETWEEN STATE-TO-STATE WTO CLAIMS
AND PRIVATE PARTY INVESTMENT RIGHTS
Ari Afilalo∗
ABSTRACT
This project is the first empirical examination of WTO filings to determine if
a private party could bring an action for damages arising under the same core
of operative facts pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty. This Article reviews
all national treatment, most favored nation, quantitative restrictions, TBT, and
SPS filings. After exploring the doctrinal and theoretical reasons for the
trade/investment tension, it analyzes those trade filings under a model
investment treaty applied in light of decided cases. This Article classifies the
filings into “Positive,” “Potentially Positive,” and “Negative” categories. The
findings show a near perfect correlation between trade and investment. These
findings are highly significant not only because this is the first empirical study
of its kind, but also because they suggest that private parties that relied on
liberalized trade laws to invest across borders would have private causes of
action for damages for protectionist measures that violate international
economic law. Trade has traditionally been the domain of state-to-state dispute
resolution, where states often operate based on rational choice, selective
determinations of which matters to prosecute. Shifting trade litigation to the
private party cause of action model would fundamentally alter sovereign
immunity and the balance of power between private parties—in particular, large
multinational corporations—and host jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I report the outcome of my study of the cases filed by
governments with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) during the WTO’s first 20 years of operation in the most
controversial areas of trade law,1 with a view to determine whether a private
party could bring a complaint before an investment arbitral tribunal that arises
from the same core operative facts as under trade law. My goal was to test if, in
fact, as I had argued before,2 the network of investment treaties regulating the
cross-border flow of capital overlaps with trade law. The answer is an
unqualified yes.
Trade filings are the domain of the WTO,3 which acts at the request of the
contracting parties’ governments and issues rulings invalidating national laws
found to violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 The
WTO hears a wide range of cases.5 It deals with controversies involving plainly
protectionist measures such as import bans or domestic taxes.6 It also decides
whether sensitive domestic laws that hinder trade pass muster under
international economic law,7 such as restrictions on the use of asbestos,8
hormones,9 or genetically modified materials;10 packaging laws regulating the

1

See infra notes 17–21.
See, e.g., Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity, and Legitimacy, Judicial (Re-)Construction of NAFTA
Chapter 11, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 279, 281–82 (2005).
3
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
4
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 3.8, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 403 [hereinafter DSU]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII(2), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 268 [hereinafter GATT].
5
See, e.g., Raj Bhala et al., WTO Case Review 2016, 34 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 281, 281–84 (2017).
6
Ari Afilalo & Sheila Foster, The World Trade Organization’s Anti-Discrimination Jurisprudence: Free
Trade, National Sovereignty, and Environmental Health in the Balance, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 633,
650–59 (2003).
7
See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R (adopted Sept. 18, 2000).
8
Laurie Kazan-Allen, The International Dimension of Asbestos in the 21st Century, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 1, 3 (2001).
9
See Suzanne Bermann, EC-Hormones and the Case for an Express WTO Post-Retaliation Procedure,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 138 (2007).
10
Daniel Schramm, The Race to Geneva: Resisting the Gravitational Pull of the WTO in the GMO
Labeling Controversy, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 93, 96 (2007).
2
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advertising and marketing of cigarettes;11 or measures intended to preserve
foreign currency reserves in a financial crisis.12
Investment law is the domain of arbitral tribunals13 awarding damages to
private parties, rather than states, when their legitimate expectations are thwarted
by government measures adopted by the host jurisdiction.14 The investment legal
regime also handles a wide array of cases, including revoked permits; breached
agreements; modifications to advance official rulings incorporating agreements
concerning the treatment of foreign investors on tax, securities regulation, and
other matters; the expropriation of property; denial of justice; administrative
irregularities; and a plethora of disputes between investors and their host states.15
The state-to-state WTO system and the investor-to-state investment
framework arose from different historical circumstances and are typically
categorized as different subject-matter areas of international law governed by
constitutional and institutional norms that sharply differ.16 Yet my analysis of
the WTO filings shows that private parties may use investment treaties to litigate
virtually all trade causes of action and obtain damages for any violation of trade
law. In this Article, I reviewed approximately 180 filings during the first two
decades of operation of the WTO that were made under the national treatment,17
most favored nation,18 and quantitative restrictions provisions of the GATT;19
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT);20 and the Agreement on
11
Suzy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149, 1151 (2013).
12
Robert W. Staiger, “Currency Manipulation” and World Trade, 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 583, 606–07
(2010).
13
What is Investment Arbitration?, INT’L ARB. L., http://internationalarbitrationlaw.com/aboutarbitration/international-disputes/investment-arbitration/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., Ari Afilalo, Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective on
NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 3 (2001); Bryan W. Blades, The Exhausting
Question of Local Remedies: Expropriation Under NAFTA Chapter 11, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 31, 64 (2006);
Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1164 (2005).
16
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 9–31.
17
GATT, supra note 4, at 204 (barring measures giving less favorable treatment to foreign products
compared to domestic products).
18
Id. at 196, 198 (barring taxation measures giving less favorable treatment to products of one country
over another country).
19
Id. at 218, 220 (barring restrictions limiting the volume or value of goods imported into the country).
20
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) was adopted as an ancillary to the GATT
Agreement to “ensure that technical regulations and standards, including packaging, marking and labelling
requirements, and procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards do not create
unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl. art. 2.2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.NT.S. 120,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
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the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).21 These cases
are grouped in this Article because they implicate similar issues of trade and
investment law and they cover most controversies dealing with the three
“pillars” of trade.
My findings leave little room to doubt that the investment framework
overlaps with the trade framework. I classified the trade cases into two
categories: Trade Positive and Trade Negative. Trade Positives are cases that
have either been decided in favor of the complainant by the DSB or did not reach
the adjudicatory stage but would have a substantial likelihood of success by the
complainant—applying trade law to the facts as stated in the filings. Cases where
the respondent prevailed or is reasonably likely to prevail belong in the Trade
Negative category. I then classified the Trade Positives and Trade Negatives into
three investment categories: Investment Positive, Potentially Positive, and
Negative. These categories are based on whether a private party would likely
prevail in an investment cause of action arising out of the same facts, would have
a colorable chance of prevailing, or would likely lose.
The examination of the respective trade and investment outcomes shows a
near-perfect correlation between Trade Positives, and Investment Positives or
Potentially Positives. Approximately two-thirds of the Trade Positives have
Investment Positive outcomes, and one-third of the Trade Positives have
Potentially Positive investment outcomes. There are no cases where, applying
investment law, a Trade Positive can be said with reasonable certainty to be an
Investment Negative. Furthermore, some losing complainants in trade could, in
an action brought by their private party nationals, raise the same issue in an
investment cause of action with a Potentially Positive outcome. (The case-bycase results are reported in tables appearing with each grouping of WTO cases
in Part III.)
These findings demonstrate that states that introduce policies inconsistent
with their obligations under the GATT expose themselves to possible investment
arbitration claims. Private parties and their attorneys could acquire a legal
weapon to challenge virtually every measure that may violate free trade and
obtain money damages for those breaches. States might escape liability for

21
As stated in the Recitals of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS), it was adopted to “elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the
use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b).” See Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 5.1–5.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, https://www.wto.org/English/
docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
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breaches of the GATT in the WTO dispute system because states—on account
of having limited legal resources and fear of retaliation for their own
violations—are likely to bring legal challenges only in disputes involving high
monetary, political, or precedential stakes.22 However, in the overlapping
investment arbitration system, states will have virtually unlimited exposure to
lawsuits brought by private parties arising from the very same measure and core
operative facts.23
In Part I, I describe the history of trade and investment and how two systems
intended to operate in different realms of international economic law came to
overlap. In Part II, I explore the doctrinal reasons for the trade/investment
tension, using decided investment cases, standard investment treaty provisions,
and familiar principles of trade law. In Part III, after explaining my methodology
for grouping trade cases and predicting outcomes, I review the filings discussed
in this Article. I conclude with some observations and a preview of the next steps
in this research project.
I.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

In Part I, I outline the historical, institutional, and constitutional features of
the trade and investment systems that are relevant to their intersection.
A. Trade
Trade is the domain of the WTO and regional frameworks such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).24 Their membership includes states
that established a relatively transparent system to monitor international
interference with their internal regulatory power.25 Those states decided to
22
Geoffrey Garrett & James McCall Smith, The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement 1, 3–4 (UCLA Int’l
Inst. Occasional Paper Series, 2002), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4t4952d7; see also infra note 27 and
accompanying text.
23
See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (2003).
24
North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1116, 1117, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
25
In particular, many scholars emphasized the benefits of the open and transparent system of the
Appellate Body’s interpretative methods, which have given clear guidance to Members of the WTO and to
panels. It has thus contributed to “providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.” DSU,
supra note 4, art. 3.2. See ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY
614 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009); see also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body,
38 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 469, 469 (2003). However, please note that, on the other hand, particularly as a result of the
lack of more formal participatory rights for NGOs, the WTO was sometimes accused of “being one of the least
transparent international organizations . . . .” See, e.g., U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 120–21 (2002).
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handle disputes without involving private parties or giving direct effect to trade
law.26 With few exceptions, only governments have the right to take
enforcement action, and individuals do not have standing to sue.27 Government
officials carefully select which disputes sufficiently implicate weighty national
interests before bringing them to dispute resolution.28 In doing so, they weigh
limited resources and the possibility of retaliation for their own violation before
initiating legal proceedings. States will exercise their prudential choice in the
marketplace of violations to determine which disputes to prosecute and which
violations to refrain from challenging (or to let stand after an initial filing), in
exchange for the other side giving up a claim of its own.29 Likewise, “networks”
of government officials forge bonds across borders to create a loose but effective
network of lawmakers and enforcers.30
The limited liability of the state enshrined in trade law is consistent with the
origins and theoretical foundations of the GATT and the WTO. The original
GATT carefully maintained a structure that protected state sovereignty and
regulatory space.31 As John Maynard Keynes famously expressed, the lawyers
as “poets of Bretton Woods” married after World War II a good economic idea

26
Helene Ruiz Fabri, Is There a Case – Legally and Politically – for Direct Effect of WTO Obligations?,
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 154 (2014).
27
NAFTA, in addition to its Investment Chapter, gives individuals some access to its dispute resolution
systems. The Side Agreement on Labor, for instance, includes a procedure pursuant to which private party
complaints may be filed and trigger investigations, public hearings, non-binding recommendations, and other
measures. If the parties fail to resolve the dispute between themselves, and if the dispute relates to certain labor
rights (e.g., occupational health and safety), then an arbitration panel will have the power to prepare a report. If
it finds that a party “persistently failed” to enforce its laws, the disputing parties will prepare an action plan, and
if the parties do not agree or if the plan is not fully implemented, the panel can be reconvened. If the panel finds
that the plan was not implemented, the offending party can be fined. If the fine is not paid, NAFTA trade benefits
can be suspended to pay the fine. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation arts. 27–29, 39(1), 41(2),
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
28
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Why Rational Choice Theory Requires a Multilevel Constitutional Approach
to International Economic Law – A Response to the Case Against Reforming the WTO’s Enforcement
Mechanism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 359, 366 (2008).
29
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press
2005); see also Robert Z. Lawrence, The United States and WTO Dispute Settlement System, in COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORTS NO. 25 at 1, 10–11 (Mar. 2007); Petersmann, supra note 28.
30
Anne-Marie Slaughter frequently discussed the efficiencies provided by government networks,
particularly the regulatory network. She described governance through a complex global web of “government
networks” whereby government officials (legislators, police investigators, judges, financial regulators, etc.)
exchange information and coordinate activity across national borders to solve problems resulting from the daily
grind of international interactions. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the
Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 200, 214, 217, 223–24
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
31
See GATT, supra note 4, at 262, 264.
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with a politically acceptable treaty system.32 The GATT established three
“pillars” of trade: tariff reduction and most favored nation,33 national
treatment,34 and prohibition of quotas and like measures. Those regimes were
designed to open borders without dictating national policy.35 The architecture of
the GATT insulated national taxation and regulation from potential infringement
by international norms.36 Its constitutional architecture was designed to leave
redistributive justice to the sovereign jurisdiction of the national political
actors.37
John Ruggie captured this bargain with his “embedded liberalism”
shorthand.38 The nations that emerged as victors from World War II featured
highly evolved administrative states and regulatory systems spanning a wide
array of economic and social issues.39 The amorphous concept of sovereignty,
in that context, captured the ability of the state to legislate at the level of its
choosing—free of constraints from conflicting norms of international law.40 The
GATT system’s adoption of the core pillars that liberalized trade without
infringing on domestic policy made it palatable for modern liberal democracies
to accept the treaty.
The state-to-state system of dispute resolution added another prophylactic
layer of sovereignty to the normative protections that was indispensable to the
contracting parties. States have limited legal resources and tend to behave
reactively in controversies that implicate national interests of sufficient political
or economic magnitude.41 They may negotiate and resolve prudentially the
32
Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading
Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 95–96 (2002).
33
GATT, supra note 4, at 196, 198.
34
Id. at 204.
35
Id. at 226.
36
Id. at 262.
37
DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER: THE EVOLVING STATE AND
THE FUTURE OF TRADE 70 (2008).
38
See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in
the Post War Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 385–88 (1982). According to Professor John Gerard Ruggie,
the GATT advanced “embedded liberalism” in each state, providing each participant, at least in theory, with the
sovereign right to establish and operate a domestic system of its choice, and at the same time removed barriers
to trade and created a more efficient trading system. Id. Each nation can maintain its identity and specific
domestic programs ranging from universal education to the supply of subsidized metro tickets for large families,
all the while participating in a liberalized system of trade that generates more global resources to share. Id.
39
See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1347–48
(2014).
40
See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, § 3.19, WTO Doc. WT/DS135 (adopted Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 European CommunitiesAsbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products Panel Report].
41
See Garrett & Smith, supra note 22, at 10.
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mutual violations that exist at any given time.42 In addition to these built-in
limitations inherent in a state-to-state system, until the 1994 establishment of the
WTO, the panel reports were not even adopted until all contracting parties,
including the losing party in the dispute, gave their consent (called the “positive
consensus rule” of the initial GATT of 1947).43 Even though the WTO reversed
this rule,44 losing a case does not entail a cataclysmic legal event for the
offending country. The GATT and later the WTO give the losing state a
reasonable amount of time to change its internal laws to comply with the
ruling.45 Although compensation and retaliation are technically available, the
theoretical and practical preference is for voluntary compliance.46
42

See id. at 8–12.
See Julio Lacarte-Muró & Fernando Piérola Castro, Comparing the WTO and GATT Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms: What Was Accomplished in the Uruguay Round?, in INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TRADE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL APPROACHES 33, 51 (Julio Lacarte-Muró & Jaime Granados eds.,
2004).
44
WTO Members changed the rule from positive consensus to negative consensus, whereby panel reports
are adopted automatically unless there is a consensus to the contrary; this rule also applies to the adoption of
Appellate Body reports, the establishment of panels, and the authorization to suspend concessions and other
obligations. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 16.4. See generally 6.4 Adoption of Panel Reports, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s4p1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
45
See Timothy Webster, How China Implements WTO Decisions, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 525, 555 n.155
(2014) (“For example, the U.S. has chosen not to repeal Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, which
the DSB determined violated the national treatment obligation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS] Agreement in 2001. The United States told the DSB that it had ‘been
working for more than ten years on the implementation of the DSB’s recommendations in this dispute,’ but has
not amended the law. Countries—including China—have routinely urged the United States to comply with the
ruling . . . .”) (citing World Trade Org. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting 22–33, WT/DSB/M/316
(July 20, 2012)).
46
The first objective of the contracting parties was traditionally “to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement.” See Understanding Regarding
Notification Consultation Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907 (adopted Nov. 28, 1979),
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) [hereinafter 1979 Understanding]. The GATT also recognized that it may take time to
make the necessary changes to domestic law in implementing the recommendations. Id. Therefore, “[i]f it is
impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations or rulings, the contracting party concerned shall
have a reasonable period of time in which to do so.” Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures, ¶ I.2, L/6489, Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) (1990). Although the withdrawal of
inconsistent measures is the prevailing remedy for a breach of the GATT, according to Article 22 of
“Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,” if a defending Member fails
to comply with the WTO decision within the established compliance period, the aggrieved party is entitled to
request temporary compensation or retaliation (i.e., to suspend concessions or obligations owed the noncomplying Member under a WTO agreement). GATT, supra note 4. However, it should be emphasized that
according to Article 22, “neither compensation nor retaliation is preferred to full implementation of a
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.” Id. According to Article 22,
“compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.” Id. Compensation
is also referenced in the Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement on Organization and Functional
Questions and the Annex to the 1979 Understanding. Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement on
Organization and Functional Questions, ¶ 64, L/327, Feb. 28, Mar. 5, 7, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd Supp.)
(1955); 1979 Understanding, supra, annex. With respect to retaliation, under GATT practice, the contracting
43
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Of course, as anyone who watched demonstrations calling for “fair trade”
must have guessed, the normative framework sheltering sovereign regulation
still leaves significant areas of pressure against national law.47 It has been widely
recognized that domestic concerns routinely burden trade, and international
trade tribunals define the boundaries of the domestic regulatory space upon
which international law may not infringe.48 By way of example, Indonesia filed
a complaint against the United States to challenge the U.S. ban on clove
cigarettes, requiring the WTO to determine whether the U.S. measure should be
upheld as furthering a valid public health goal or invalidated as a protectionist
scheme to favor domestic menthol cigarettes in competition with clove.49
Argentina had to defend before investment arbitration panels measures designed
to shift to its trading partners costs associated with shoring up domestic currency
reserves, an essential domestic policy goal in a country beset by financial
crises.50 The WTO had to determine whether EU bans on asbestos and hormones
furthered a valid domestic policy regarding health and occupational safety or

parties may only be authorized by the DSB to retaliate when a violating party does not comply with a panel
recommendation within a reasonable period of time, and retaliation most often involves the suspension of GATT
tariff concessions. GATT, supra note 4. There was only one instance where retaliation was authorized under
GATT. KIL WON LEE, IMPROVING REMEDIES IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 17 (Proquest, Umi
Dissertation Publ’g 2011) (“In Netherlands Measures of Suspension, the U.S. did not remove its import
restrictions, which were found to be inconsistent to the General Agreement. In response, the Contracting Parties
authorized the Netherlands to ‘suspend the application to the United States of their obligation under the General
Agreement to the extent necessary to allow the Netherlands Government to impose an upper limit of 60,000
metric tons on imports of wheat flour from the United States during the calendar year 1953.’ However, the
Netherlands did not retaliate against the US. After a number of years, a compromise was apparently reached as
the US relaxed its quotas on Edam and Gouda cheese and the Netherlands no longer requested the extension of
its authority to retaliate.”). See generally Asim Imdad Ali, Non-Compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 14 J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 5 (2003).
47
Fair trade is a shorthand expression to capture goods that have been produced in accordance with
principles of respect for labor rights, the environment, and other considerations. See generally Paulette L.
Stanzer, The Pursuit of Equilibrium as the Eagle Meets the Condor: Supporting Sustainable Development
Through Fair Trade, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 557, 557 (2012) (“Fair Trade is a label for a movement, a process, and a
set of principles. Fair Trade goods can be identified in one of two ways: (1) specific goods have been certified
by a Fair Trade organization or (2) goods that are sold by a seller who is a member of a Fair Trade organization
recognized by the Fair Trade community.”).
48
See Ari Afilalo, Rotating Checks and Balances in International Economic Law, in HANDBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE 414, 418 (David Deese ed., 2014); see, e.g., Claude E. Barfield,
Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 2 CH. J. INT’L L. 403, 412
(2001); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36
U. Pᴀ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 1, 1 (2014).
49
Afilalo, supra note 48; see, e.g., Lucas Ballet, Losing Flavor: Indonesia’s WTO Complaint Against the
U.S. Ban on Clove Cigarettes, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 515, 516–18 (2011).
50
Afilalo, supra note 48; see Robert M. Ziff, The Sovereign Debtors Prison: Analysis of the Argentine
Crisis Arbitrations and the Implications for Investment Treaty Law, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 345, 362
(2011).
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amounted to an illegal protection of a competitive domestic product.51 “The
great questions of trade have often hinged on the judgment call of a tribunal in
favor of the domestic regulatory space or, alternatively, on the side of the free
movement of goods.”52 The trade system is creating obstacles to challenges to
sovereignty because when trade encroaches on the sovereign right to regulate, it
should act within the confines of a system that has legitimacy.53
Moreover, “the WTO has gradually supplemented the core GATT pillars
with agreements that go beyond the negative injunctions and discriminatory
rationale of the treaty.”54 The SPS, for example, requires that states engage in a
risk assessment and rely on credible scientific evidence before adopting sanitary
measures, such as rules banning apples that may suffer from fire blight or beef
with hormones.55 The TBT encourages the Contracting Parties to regulate based
on international standards, bans the maintenance of measures that are no longer
necessary to achieve their objectives, and provides that technical measures may
not hinder trade more than necessary to achieve the underlying objective.56 The
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS)
requires the Contracting Parties to conform their levels of intellectual protection
to the international minimum mandate.57 Going beyond discrimination and
protectionism as the rationale for invalidating a national measure creates a

51
Afilalo, supra note 48; see also Afilalo & Foster, supra note 6, at 658; Bhala et al., supra note 5, at
362 n.157, 441.
52
Afilalo, supra note 48.
53
This system resembled the classic international organizations of the time such as the United Nations
and the European Union, whose basic laws were premised on the inviolability of the participating states’ rights
to be free from interference by others. See, e.g., Ari Afilalo & Dennis Patterson, Statecraft and the Foundations
of European Union Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 275, 287 (Julie Dickson
& Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012) (describing how European Treaties, for example, although “more ambitious
than any international treaty in force at the time, still provided a substantial level of protection of the Member
States’ ability to legislate.”). “Each Member State could, to a certain extent, remain a “black box” in which it
enjoyed freedom to determine how best to support the welfare of its nations, free from interference by European
law.” Id.
54
Afilalo, supra note 48, at 419.
55
See SPS Agreement, supra note 21, arts. 5.1–5.2.
56
See TBT Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.2.
57
See TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. “The TRIPS Agreement is arguably one of the most controversial
of the Uruguay Round Agreements and has been the subject of numerous articles and commentaries.” Uche
Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The Pharmaceutical Industry, Ethics, and Global
Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 204 n.4 (2005) (citing ROBERT L. OSTERGARD, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT
DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 110
(2003)); Haochen Sun, A Wider Access to Patented Drugs Under the TRIPS Agreement, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 101,
102 (2003)).
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potentially higher level of pressure on state sovereignty.58 The international
trade regime has often been under attack because of the pressure it imposes on
state sovereignty.59
B. Investment
Investment treaties embody a different rationale and arose from a different
history than trade law.60 At their core, they aim to give private investors a direct
cause of action against the central government of the host state.61 The very same
modern liberal democracies, led by the United States, for whom sheltering
sovereignty in the trade context had been so important, insisted that their
investors should have the right to bring a claim against the states wherever they
do business.62 They rejected domestic courts as the venue for investor claims as
unreliably biased and demanded an international neutral arbitral forum instead.63
They sought to hold the central governments of the host states responsible for
violations committed by any branch of government, whether executive,
legislative, or judicial, and whether central, regional, or local.64 These tribunals,
the West insisted, should have the power to award damages to make aggrieved
investors whole and compensate them for treaty violations, with awards being
enforceable in domestic courts under normal principles of arbitration law.65
This stance was, originally, squarely aimed at protecting investments in
emerging economies.66 The international conversation about investment
protection started after decolonization and quickly became a focal point of the
ideological dispute between industrialized and less-developed nations.67 It first
took place in the context of the Western (or “Northern,” as industrialized states
were often labeled) push for a multilateral investment treaty that would write

58
Ari Afilalo, Failed Boundaries: The Near-Perfect Correlation Between State-to-State WTO Claims
and Private Party Investment Rights 11 (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 01, 2013).
59
Id.; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1997,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-09-01/real-new-world-order.
60
Afilalo, supra note 58; Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance:
Investment Treaties, Developing Countries, and Bounded Rationality (June 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
London School of Economics and Political Science), http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/141/1/Poulsen_Sacrificing_
sovereignty_by_chance.pdf.
61
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 4; Afilalo, supra note 58.
62
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 4–5; Afilalo, supra note 58.
63
Afilalo, supra note 15 at 17; Afilalo, supra note 58.
64
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 4; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 11–12.
65
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 31; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12.
66
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 18; Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct
Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 29 VAN. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 261–62 (1994).
67
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12.
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into international law their substantive and institutional needs.68 Capitalexporting countries worried about the economic interests they left behind when
their former colonies achieved political self-determination.69 They wanted the
framework investment treaty to include a clear requirement that the newly
independent governments would not expropriate private property unless the
government paid compensation at fair market value.70
The capital-exporting countries also wanted protection against
discriminatory treatment.71 The countries of the South sought to impose
“performance requirements” on foreign investors to shore up the domestic
economy, such as domestic content, capital, or intellectual property transfers;
mandatory partnerships with local businesses; and other measures intended to
give the hosts greater and longer-term benefits than those obtained in the normal
course of business.72 In addition, the North demanded that the broad body of
customary international law guaranteeing minimum standards of protection73 be
applied and guaranteed by the international arbitration tribunals.74
For the South, these demands amounted to yet another manifestation of
colonial arrogance.75 The political self-determination that the former colonies
had earned would not be complete without economic self-determination, and the
framework advocated by their erstwhile colonizers would make this goal
unattainable.76 Property acquired by their former colonizers’ economic agents
and left behind by their political echelons should be nationalized as necessary.
The expropriation of the foreign economic interests would not, under the South’s
view, necessitate a payment of full market value by the nationalizing
government—rather, that the nationalizing state would only be required to pay
68
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 18; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see also PETER J. BURNELL, ECONOMIC
NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD 243–44 (Westview Press 1996); Sandrino, supra note 66, at 259 (reviewing
Mexico’s historic leadership role in the South and its subsequent acceptance of the positions espoused by the
more developed countries with the adoption of NAFTA).
69
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 14; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12.
70
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT’L
L. 121, 126 (1984).
71
Andrea Saldarriaga & Kendra Magraw, UNCTAD’s Effort to Foster the Relationship Between
International Investment Law and Sustainable Development, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 125, 131 (Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hofmann eds.,
2015).
72
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see BURNELL, supra note 68.
73
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see Charles N. Brower & John Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law, 9 INT’L LAW. 295, 302 (1975).
74
Afilalo, supra note 58 at 12; see, e.g., David E. Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a
Contractual Renunciation of Diplomatic Protection, 6 TEX. INT’L F. 289, 304 (1971).
75
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12.
76
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 17–18; Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12.
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whatever is “adequate in the circumstances” (i.e., not much in a postcolonization context).77 The host countries should have the right to protect
themselves against the risk of “dependent development” by imposing
performance requirements and making sure that foreign capital infusion
generates the opportunity to sustain long-term, meaningful development.78
Minimum standards of protection should be rejected because the customary
international law that defined them had, for the most part, been developed during
an era when the colonizers subjugated the newly formed states of the South.79
The parties also feuded as to the proper venue for bringing claims. The West
demanded neutral, supra-national courts, whereas the “Calvo Doctrine”
categorically rejected the grant of jurisdiction to international tribunals.80 Under
that doctrine, domestic courts of the newly independent countries would apply,
as they saw fit, domestic standards adopted independently of the colonizer and
its yoke.81 This, too, was an indispensable element of the self-determination
package.82 In 1977, the United Nations adopted the “Charter of the Economic
Rights and Duties of States,” with Southern and non-aligned votes approving the
Charter over the objection of the industrialized states of the North.83 This
effectively ended the Northern hope for a multilateral investment treaty, and
such an international agreement was never reached between the North and the
South.84
And yet, the North ultimately prevailed.85 The victory of the North did not
come with a formal capitulation or dramatic watershed event such as the
77
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12; see, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International
Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 168 (2005).
78
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 12–13. See generally Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence,
60 AM. ECON. REV. 231, 235–36 (1970).
79
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13; Vandevelde, supra note 77, at 159–60.
80
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13; Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising Out of Foreign Direct
Investment in Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59 JUL DISP.
RESOL. J. 78, 80 (2004); see also Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbitration of International Oil, Gas
& Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 N. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 591, 592 (2007).
81
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13.
82
Id.
83
Id.; see Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation
of Foreign Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 437, 437 (1981).
84
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13. Attempts to create multilateral investment agreements can be traced back
to the end of the 1950s. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 18 (2008). Among these attempts are the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD) draft that was not accepted by non-member countries and the attempt to achieve a multilateral
investment agreement as part of the unsuccessful negotiations over the proposed International Trade
Organization (ITO). See, e.g., id., at 18; ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 19–22 (2009).
85
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13.
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adoption of a multilateral treaty or an international conference.86 Instead, it came
quietly and gradually.87 Starting in the 1990s, the South stopped being the old
South and began its transformation into a powerful bloc of emerging markets.88
The financial world coalesced into intertwined markets competing for capital.
Private investors and their foreign direct investment became a sought-after
source of funds and, with technological advances, they acquired access to instant
and plentiful information regarding the host jurisdiction.89 “BRICS” countries
emerged,90 fueled by export manufacturing.91 A symbiotic relationship of
interdependence (export countries reinvest the profits made in the import
countries into the economies of such import markets, thereby stimulating more
demand) became a mainstay of international commerce.92 In this new global
culture, bilateral investment treaties proliferated with cross-border investment.
This resulted in the commercial and financial worlds becoming regulated by
thousands of investment treaties entered into bilaterally, trilaterally, or within
the framework of regional agreements such as Chapter 11 of NAFTA.93
The issues of the day from the post-decolonization time became much less
sensitive.94 Regardless of whether the “signal value”95 of investment treaties was
a necessary prerequisite and condition for foreign capital to flow into a host
nation, the countries that previously were so attached to rejecting the multilateral
investment framework advocated by the West suddenly seemed to care a lot
less.96 Mexico’s story is a perfect example of this phenomenon.97 After spending
decades as the flag-bearer of the South in the investment dispute, Mexico signed
on in the early 1990s to the Investment Chapter of NAFTA, which is the poster

86

Id.
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
BRIC was a term coined in 2001 by James O’Neill, an economist and former Goldman & Sachs analyst,
which became a shorthand for the alliances of Brazil, Russia, India, and China on various issues. Tamara Fisher,
China and the New Development Bank: The Future of Foreign Aid?, 38 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 141,
141 (2016). This group now includes South Africa. See id.
91
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 13.
92
Id. at 14; see Afilalo, supra note 15, at 17–19.
93
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 14.
94
Id.
95
See Jeswal W. Salacuse, Of Handcuffs and Signals: Investment Treaties and Capital Flows to
Developing Countries, 58 HARV. INT’L L.J. 127, 164 (2017) (arguing that investment treaties influence capital
flows through the signals they send to international capital markets as shown by empirical model-comparing
countries that fit “Strong BIT Signal Country” as opposed to “Weak Signal BIT Countries.”).
96
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 14.
97
Id.
87
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child for the Western investment treaty model.98 With it, Mexico accepted
takings, national treatment, most favored nation, and minimum standards
language of the type advocated by the United States—its longstanding foe on
the investment scene.99 The International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) became the forum for arbitration, under
the United States’ and World Bank’s respective aegis, of investment disputes.100
At the end of the day, instead of a single multilateral treaty, thousands of bilateral
and regional investment alliances arose, giving the West the globalized rules of
investment protection that it had advocated.101
C. Investment and Trade Overlap. We Should Care.
The respective history and theoretical foundations of investment and trade
should make it clear that there must be a doctrinal boundary between the two
fields.102 Yet, as it currently stands, the doctrinal expression of the trade and
investment fields leads to a virtually complete overlap of the two systems.103 As
the empirical analysis of this Article confirms, where a cause of action exists for
a state in international trade, a parallel cause of action has a high likelihood of
prevailing under a bilateral investment treaty.104 “The upshot of collapsing
investment into trade could be an explosion of high stakes litigation,
overshadowing and taking over the delicately balanced system of trade
integration of the WTO.”105 As the European Union’s history has shown, this is
not an academic scenario.106 The private attorneys general, armed with their
lawyers, will vigorously pursue individual causes of action arising from states’
violations of national treatment, quantitative and like measures, and other core
trade laws.107 Equating investment with trade would radically unsettle a WTO
98
Id.; see Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibility for Economic Injury to
Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After the NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1147, 1149
(1994).
99
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 14.
100
Afilalo, supra note 48, at 421.
101
David Deese, Introduction: Politics, Trade, and the International Political Economy, in HANDBOOK
OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE 13 (David Deese ed., 2014).
102
Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds
Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 49–50 (2008).
103
Afilalo, supra note 48, at 421.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 102, at 53 (“This spike in investment disputes produced something
of a backlash against BITs, with numerous countries softening their BIT commitments or withdrawing from
BITs altogether.”).
107
Id.

AFILALO GALLEYPROOFS

482

5/29/2018 1:11 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

system that never contemplated the award of damages to an unlimited class of
plaintiffs.108
The problem will be compounded in the United States where attorneys are
permitted to work on contingency fees.109 The business model of contingency
fees lends itself very well to investment claims challenging government
measures.110 States defending complaints will have a strong incentive to settle
because, as will be illustrated throughout this Article, it will be difficult to
conclude with certainty that a case has no merit.111 The officials assessing the
exposure will then, in most instances, have to factor into their calculations some
likelihood of success on the complainants’ part.112 The magnitude of harm that
they would face if defeated would more often than not reach very high levels.113
Discounting the possible damages with the likelihood of success ascribed to the
case, even if low, would likely yield a high number and, hence, give the
respondents a strong incentive to settle.114
In Part II of this Article, I analyze the substantive provisions of the trade and
investment regimes as well as their dispute resolution mechanisms, and expose
how the overlap operates doctrinally.

108
Afilalo, supra note 15, at 32–35; see also Bruce Carolan, The Legislative Backlash to Advances in
Rights for Same-Sex Couples: Judicial Impediments to Legislating Equality for Same-Sex Couples in the
European Union, 40 TULSA L. REV. 527, 530 n.18 (2005) (“In essence, this transforms every EU citizen into a
private attorney general, and greatly enhances the effectiveness (effet utile) of EU law.”).
109
W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States the
“Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 361, 372 (1999) (“The U.S. is
unique in its wide use of contingent fees as a method of financing litigation.”).
110
Afilalo, supra note 58, at 15.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. “The contingent fee is an extremely common form of paying for the services of lawyers in the U.S.”
Davis, supra note 109. “In fact, it is now the dominant means of financing cases in many important areas of
legal practice, including the collection of overdue commercial accounts, stockholder’s suits, class actions, tax
practice, condemnation proceedings, will contests, and—of course—personal injury litigation.” Id. The fact that
arbitral panels have discretion to adjudicate claims for substantial damages in proceedings that are less
transparent than courts increases the likelihood that a contingency lawyer would accept the case in the hope of
securing a settlement that yields a sufficient contingent fee to justify the venture.
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II. HOW INVESTMENT CAPTURES TRADE
A. BITs, FTAs, and MIAs: Substantive Provisions and Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms
There are nearly 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force.115
Commentators have debated the extent to which BITs are indispensable—or
even relevant—legal means of attracting private foreign investments.116 Yet, the
financial and commercial map of the world is littered with them.117 Not all BITs
look alike.118 However, although their overall structure and semantics may vary,
the global body of investment laws features converging doctrinal hallmarks.
These treaties usually provide that foreign enterprises should not be treated less
favorably than similarly situated domestic counterparts and should not make
“performance requirements” unlawful.119 They require states that expropriate
115
See JONATHAN BONNITCHA, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2017). Lists of Bilateral Investment Treaties can be found on the
website of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). International Investment
Agreements Navigator, INV. POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Mar. 25,
2018).
116
See, e.g., SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 382 (Brian Pearce trans., Monthly Review Press 1974); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE
MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM III: THE SECOND ERA OF GREAT EXPANSION OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY
1730–1840S (1989); Afilalo, supra note 15, at 13–19; Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American
Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 304 (1997); Kevin Banks,
NAFTA’s Article 1110 - Can Regulation Be Expropriation?, 5 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 499 (1999); Eduardo Jiménez
de Aréchaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 179 (1978); Sandrino, supra note 66, at 259.
117
See IIA Mapping Project, INV. POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/
mappedContent (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
118
See, e.g., Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral
Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303 (2009); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005); Stephan W. Schill,
Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496
(2009).
119
NAFTA, supra note 24. Several types of performance requirements are explicitly prohibited by Chapter
11 of NAFTA. See id. For instance, requirements for domestic equity are prohibited under NAFTA Article
1102(4). Id. art. 1102(4). Requirements for the mandatory transfer of intellectual property, as well as
requirements for use of minimum levels of domestic content, are prohibited under Article 1106. Id. art. 1106.
Requirements that specific managerial positions be of a certain nationality are prohibited under Article 1107(1),
though 1107(2) conditionally allows a requirement for the nationality of a percentage of the board of directors.
Id. art. 1107(1)–(2). Finally, restrictions on dividend transfers are prohibited under Article 1109(1)(a). Id. art.
1109(1)(a); see, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Bol.-U.S., art. VI–VII, Apr. 17, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. No.
106-25 (prohibiting many kinds of performance requirements); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED
COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/7, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.D.32 (2003) (explaining that
performance requirements that are not prohibited by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures may be addressed in various agreements at the bilateral or regional levels).
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foreign assets—outright or through regulatory takings—to do so only for a
public purpose and upon payment of compensation at fair market value.120 They
also typically include the international minimum standards of protection as a
catch-all guardian of the security of foreigners’ economic rights.121 On the
dispute resolution front, BITs122 customarily grant foreign investors the right to
bring a claim against the host state for violations of the treaty before ICSID,123
ICSID’s Additional Facility,124 or UNCITRAL.125
For the purposes of this Article, I use hypothetical provisions of an
investment treaty inspired by the typical provision of BITs—in particular,
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which represents standard language for a BIT.126 For
national treatment, my treaty provisions state that “[e]ach Party shall accord to
investors of the other Party and their investments treatment no less favorable
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and
120
Compare Bilateral Investment Treaty, Alb.-U.S., art. III(1), Jan. 11, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. No. 10419 (prohibiting direct or indirect expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments without compensation),
with U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating similarly that “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
121
See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Croat.-U.S., art. II, July 13, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-29
(establishing standards of protection for foreign investors’ economic security rights in the other state).
122
See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, Ger.-India, July 10, 1995 (1998); Bilateral Investment Treaty,
China-Japan, Aug. 27, 1988 (1989); Bilateral Investment Treaty, Arg.-U.S., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No.
103-2; U.S. Dep’t of State, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004).
123
INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES
(2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf.
The
ICSID is an autonomous international institution, established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (Washington Convention), and operating under the World
Bank, that acts as an impartial international forum for the resolution of legal disputes between Member States
(or between a Member State and a national of another Member State), either through conciliation or arbitration
procedures. Id. at 5.
124
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY
RULES (Sept. 27, 1978), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Additional-Facility-Rules.aspx.
The ICSID Additional Facility is a branch of ICSID established to administer, inter alia, conciliation and
arbitration proceedings between Member States and non-Member States. Id.
125
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is the United Nations’
international trade division and is mostly concerned with collecting, organizing, and disseminating guidelines
and conventions for international trade law. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL 5
(2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf.
The
Washington Convention broke with previous dogma that only states could bring claims against other states.
INT’L CENT. SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, art. 33 (Mar. 18,
1965), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf. There are
alternative avenues for bringing a claim under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules in addition to BITs, such as
investment agreements between the state and the investor or investment laws enacted by the state. Id. art. 24.
However, in such cases the applicable law tends to be the local law as opposed to international law. Id. art. 42(1).
126
This Article will use the term “IT” to encompass any possible FTAs, BITs, or MIAs.
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sale or other disposition of investments.”127 For most favored nation, this
investment treaty (IT) provides that “each Party shall accord to investors of the
other Party and their investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords,
in like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale
or other disposition of investments in its territory.”128
For a minimum standard of treatment, I apply the following typical clause:
“Each Party shall accord to investments of another Party treatment in accordance
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full
protection and security.”129 For expropriation, my IT will read: “Neither Party
may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly
through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization and tantamount
measures (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a nondiscriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation; and (d) in accordance with due process of law. For the avoidance
of doubt, compensation shall not be deemed to be adequate unless it is equal to
the fair market value of the expropriated property.”
And, of course, I assume that, like NAFTA and other BITs, international
arbitral panels have jurisdiction to hear the case and award damages.

B. Brief Summary of the GATT Framework
Article III of the GATT incorporates the familiar national treatment
provisions of trade law.130 It provides that imported products should receive
treatment no less favorable by way of taxation or regulation than “like” domestic
products and that domestic products in competition with imported products
should not be afforded tax or regulatory treatment that gives them a protective
advantage over the imported products.131 Article I provides that imported
127
NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1102; see also Agreement on Investment under the Framework Agreement
on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic
of India, ASEAN-India, Nov. 12, 2014, http://www.asean.org/storage/2016/04/ASEAN-India-InvestmentAgreement-ASEAN-version.pdf.
128
NAFTA, supra note 24, art. 1103; see also Agreement between Japan and the Oriental Republic of
Uruguay for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Uru., art. 4, Jan. 26, 2015,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000071951.pdf.
129
See Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Korea, China-S. Kor., Sept. 7, 2007, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea/annex/
xdzw_en.pdf.
130
GATT, supra note 4, art. III.
131
See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 350–403 (2013).
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products must be afforded most favored nation treatment,132 meaning that the
jurisdiction of import may not treat these products less favorably than like
products from another contracting party.133 Article XI of the GATT bans quotas
and like measures,134 including a broad array of regulations discussed in Part III,
such as certain import licensing schemes, bans on certain products deemed
dangerous to health or other domestic concerns (e.g., asbestos, beef with
hormones, genetically modified organisms, etc.), and other measures that have
the effect of quantitatively restricting imports.135
The SPS provides that sanitary and phytosanitary measures may not give
imported products less favorable treatment than is afforded to like domestic
products or like products of another contracting state.136 In addition to this
traditional discrimination rationale, the SPS provides that, “[m]ember States
shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence
. . . .”137
The TBT follows a similar logic. It provides that technical regulations may
not treat imported products less favorably than like products of national origin
and to like products originating in any other country.138 In addition, it requires
the Member States to make sure that no “unnecessary obstacles” to trade are
created by way of technical regulations,139 and it provides incentives for states
to follow international standards when those exist.140

132

GATT, supra note 4, art. I.
See BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 131, at 315–35.
134
GATT, supra note 4, art. XI.
135
Id. Article XI of the GATT generally prohibits quantitative restrictions on the importation or
exportation of any product, stating “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges
shall be instituted or maintained by any [Member] . . . .” Id. See generally, BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 131,
at 481–98.
136
SPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 2.2.
137
See Damien J. Neven & Joseph H.H. Weiler, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples
(AB-2003-4): One Bad Apple? (DS245/AB/R): A Comment, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003: THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS’ STUDIES 284 (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2004).
138
TBT Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2.1.
139
Id.
140
Id. art. 2.4 (“Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their
completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical
regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.”).
133
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Article XX includes the customary exceptions to the trade disciplines,
quoted in relevant parts below.
Provided that they do not violate its chapeau, Article XX protects measures
that are:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . .
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, . . .
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption . . . .141

C. Why the GATT and NAFTA Are Co-Extensive
Causes of action arising under Articles I, III, XI of the GATT, or under SPS
or TBT, may fall within the investment provisions of our IT because: (i) they
involve treatment less favorable for foreign investors and therefore trigger the
national treatment provisions of the IT; or (ii) the aggrieved investor may claim
that the measure so severely deprived it of the benefits of its investment as to
amount to an expropriation; or (iii) the investor may argue that, under minimum
standards of international law, it had a legitimate expectation that the host
jurisdiction would comply with its obligations under a treaty, and that the
investor made an investment decision in reliance on a particular regulatory
climate.142 The minimum standards of treatment provisions may, based on the
facts of the individual case, give the investors additional arguments.143 For
example, an agency’s failure to grant an import license—its lack of
transparency, or otherwise its failure to adhere to administrative due process—
may violate the minimum standards of treatment.
I selected a few cases from investment law to illustrate its overlap with trade
law. The first group of cases arose under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter (Chapter
11) in connection with a challenge to Mexican measures that complainants
alleged favored the Mexican sugar cane industry to the detriment of foreign high

141

GATT, supra note 4, art. xx. See BOSSCHE & ZDOUC, supra note 131, at 543–82.
Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 417–21 (2006).
143
DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 102, at 67.
142
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fructose corn syrup (HFCS) producers.144 In the first case, Archer Daniels
Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc., two companies
formed under the laws of the United States that owned a Mexican subsidiary,145
challenged a Mexican twenty percent excise tax (the IEPS tax)146 on soft drinks
and syrups, and services used to transfer and distribute those products.147 The
tax applied only to drinks and syrups if they used sweeteners other than cane
sugar, such as HFCS.148 Not surprisingly, HFCS was associated with American
producers, and cane sugar was associated with Mexican producers.149 The IEPS
tax remained in effect from January 1, 2002, until 2007 when, as described
below, Mexico lost the WTO case and removed the measure.150‘
The second investment proceeding, brought by Cargill, another American
company,151 arose out of the same regulatory framework.152 However, the case
did not focus solely on the IEPS tax and instead examined it in the broader
context of a Mexican concerted effort to stem the tide of HFCS imports into the
country. The complainants challenged a decree adopted by Mexico in 2001,153
pursuant to which HFCS importers from the United States would require a
permit issued by the Mexican Secretary of the Economy.154 If a given importer

144
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award (Nov.
21, 2007).
145
Id. ¶ 8.
146
Id. ¶ 2. In Mexico, the IEPS Amendment (that incorporated IEPS tax) was temporarily suspended by
Presidential Decree. Id. ¶ 46. On July 12, 2002, the Mexican Supreme Court declared this suspension
unconstitutional and reinstated the IEPS Amendment. Id. ¶ 83. The IEPS Amendment was also the subject of an
advisory ruling by the Mexican Commission Federal de Competencia. Id. The IEPS Amendment was also subject
to a constitutional challenge in the Mexican courts by individual taxpayers, with the result that some soft drink
bottlers, but not others, are exempt from the tax on the basis of successful amparo challenges. Id.
147
Id. ¶ 2.
148
Id.
149
Id. ¶¶ 6–8.
150
Appellate Body Report, Mexico–Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 173, WTO Doc.
WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) (addressing the legality under international trade law of tax measures on soft
drinks and other beverages, further discussed in Part II). This case arose after Mexico continued to come up with
measures to protect its sugarcane industry, following the invalidation of previous anti-dumping measures by the
WTO and a NAFTA tribunal convened under Chapter 19. Id.
151
Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award (Sept. 18, 2009).
There is also a third case brought by Corn Products International, Inc., but the award is not public. Corn Products
Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility (Jan. 15,
2008).
152
Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 1 (Sept. 18,
2009). Cargill, incorporated in the United States, sold HFCS through its subsidiary Cargill de Mexico, S.A. de
C.V. Id.
153
Cargill also brought a claim under the most-favored-nation provisions of Article 1103, which the
Tribunal rejected. Id. ¶¶ 227–34.
154
Id. ¶ 117.
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did not have a permit, its products would be subject to a higher tariff than the
NAFTA tariff.155
The same measures were also challenged by states before the WTO, with the
DSB finding against Mexico on this trade front.156 The DSB Panel found that
the IEPS tax violated the national treatment obligations of Mexico under Article
III:4 of the GATT.157 It held that (1) soft drinks containing HFCS are “like” soft
drinks containing cane sugar, and the tax on soft drinks with HFCS was in excess
of taxes imposed on the like domestic products and (2) HFCS and sugar are
directly competitive or substitutable products, and dissimilar taxation was
applied in a way that offered protection to domestic products.158 Mexico
defended the IEPS tax under the Article XX(d) exception with an argument that
the measures were necessary to secure compliance with NAFTA itself. Mexico
claimed that the United States had violated NAFTA and retaliation was the only
means of securing American compliance with the treaty.159 The Panel rejected
the Mexican argument and held that the term “laws or regulations” under Article
XX(d) refers to the rules that form part of the domestic legal order (including
domestic legislative acts intended to implement international obligations) of the
WTO Member invoking Article XX(d) and do not cover obligations of another
WTO Member (here, the United States’ obligations under NAFTA).160 The
Appellate Body (AB) upheld the Panel’s conclusions.161
In the NAFTA investment cases, Mexico also argued that the case belonged
to a trade—not an investment—dispute-resolution framework.162 Mexico argued
that a claim related to the imposition of a permit requirement was beyond the
jurisdiction of the tribunal because it involved the trade of goods and was

155

Id.
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 9.4, WTO Doc.
WT/DS308/R (adopted Oct. 7, 2005).
157
Id. ¶¶ 9.2(a)(iii) & 9.2(b).
158
Id. ¶ 9.2.
159
Id. ¶ 9.3.
160
As explained in greater detail below, Cargill brought a broader challenge under NAFTA to a series of
measures adopted by Mexico as part of its anti-HFCS campaign, including prominently import permit
requirements. Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 299 (Sept.
18, 2009) (“Reviewing closely the record of this case, the Tribunal finds ample support for the conclusion that
the import permit was one of a series of measures expressly intended to injure United States HFCS producers
and suppliers in Mexico in an effort to persuade the United States government to change its policy on sugar
imports from Mexico.”).
161
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, supra note 156,
¶ 9.5.
162
Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 136 (Sept. 18,
2009).
156
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governed by NAFTA Chapter 3, not Chapter 11.163 Chapter 3 was the NAFTA
replica of the GATT provisions invoked before the WTO, and Mexico
essentially asked the arbitration panel to establish a boundary between the two
domains.164 The NAFTA Tribunal found for the claimant and rejected the
argument that the case belonged exclusively to a trade venue.165
The Tribunal held that the existence of separate regimes applicable to trade
in goods/services and investment does not ipso facto mean that there can be no
overlap between the two.166 It found that HFCS and cane sugar producers
operated in “like circumstances” due to the competitive relationship between
them.167 In these circumstances, the Tribunal ruled, the IEPS tax was
discriminatory and designed to afford protection to the domestic sugarcane
industry.168 These findings translated into a violation of the national treatment
provisions of Article 1102.169 The Tribunal also found a violation of the
performance requirements of Article 1106(3) because the IEPS tax exempted
soft drinks using cane sugar contingent upon the use of domestic products.170
While the IEPS tax conferred advantages on sugar without discrimination
between foreign and domestic investors, the reality was that the sugar industry
in Mexico was essentially domestic and the disparate impact on the foreign
producers warranted a finding of national treatment violation.171 The Tribunal
rejected Mexico’s countermeasures defense for the same reason as the WTO did,
finding that the IEPS tax was not taken to induce U.S. compliance with its
NAFTA obligations, but rather to protect domestic industry.172
In the second NAFTA proceeding, Cargill’s broader level challenge to the
Mexican anti-HFCS campaign focused in particular on the import permit
requirement that Mexico adopted in addition to the IEPS tax.173 The Tribunal
found that the “import permit was one of the series of measures expressly
intended to injure U.S. HFCS producers and suppliers in Mexico in an effort to
163
164
165

Id. ¶ 191.
NAFTA, supra note 24, at ch. 23.
Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Final Award, ¶ 193 (Sept. 18,

2009).
166

Id. ¶ 148.
Id. ¶ 211.
168
Id. ¶¶ 219–20.
169
Id. ¶ 223.
170
Id. ¶¶ 313, 316, 319.
171
Id. ¶¶ 317–18.
172
Id. ¶ 412. The Tribunal did not find that Mexico had expropriated the claimants’ investment because
the measure of interference was not substantial enough—the Claimants remained in control of their investment
in Mexico throughout the entire relevant time period. Id. ¶¶ 317–18, 348, 363.
173
Id. ¶¶ 224–25.
167
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persuade the U.S. government to change its policy on sugar imports from
Mexico.”174 The Tribunal concluded that the introduction of the permit
requirement was a manifestly unjust measure because its sole purpose was to
persuade the United States to change its trade practices.175 By imposing such an
import requirement, Mexico targeted few suppliers of HFCS that originated in
the United States and made them carry the burden of Mexico’s efforts to
influence U.S. policy.176 The Tribunal called such practice “willful targeting”
that, by its nature, constituted a manifest injustice in violation of its obligation
to offer fair and equitable treatment under Article 1105 (minimum standards of
treatment).177 Furthermore, the Tribunal found this measure to amount to gross
misconduct because, when adopting the permit requirement, the Mexican
government did not introduce objective criteria according to which the company
could obtain an import permit.178
These companion cases illustrate the doctrinal overlap between the treaties.
This is by no means the only controversy that raises the issue. While it is beyond
the scope of this Article to engage in a comprehensive review, I will review a
few other cases to further exemplify the doctrinal construct that my empirical
study confirms.
In Ethyl v. Canada,179 a Virginia corporation with a Canadian subsidiary
argued that a Canadian statute banning imports of the gasoline additive MMT
violated Canada’s obligations under NAFTA Chapter 11.180 Ethyl, the claimant,
argued that Canada had violated national treatment (Article 1102), prohibition
of expropriation (Article 1110), and the rules against performance requirements
(Article 1106).181 Ethyl claimed $251,000,000 in damages to cover the losses
associated with its inability to sell MMT made in its production plant and the
prejudice to its goodwill.182 In addition to asserting various procedural

174

Id. ¶ 299.
Id.
176
Id. ¶ 300.
177
Id. ¶¶ 2, 300, 550.
178
Id. ¶ 301. The Tribunal rejected the most-favored nation claim made by Cargill on technical grounds.
Id. ¶¶ 284, 286, 298, 301.
179
Ethyl Corp. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award On Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), 38
I.L.M. 708, 722, ¶¶ 3–4 (1999).
180
The statute prohibited international trade of or import of MMT for commercial purposes except under
authorization under Section 5. Section 5 precluded any authorizations for additions to unleaded gasoline.
Meanwhile, production and sale of MMT in Canada were not prohibited. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
181
Id. ¶¶ 7, 18.
182
Id. ¶¶ 71–73. See Patricia Isela Hansen, The Interplay Between Trade and the Environment Within the
NAFTA Framework, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 326 (Fracesco Francioni,
175
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defenses,183 Canada also argued that the ban was justified by concerns about the
environmental and health risks associated with MMT.184 Canada and Ethyl
settled the Chapter 11 claim in 1998 before proceeding to the merits.185 Under
the settlement, the Canadian government agreed to withdraw the legislation and
to pay Ethyl $13 million in compensation.186 This is a case that could have been
a run-of-the-mill WTO filing. Although it was prompted in part by the domestic
proceedings, its settlement also exemplifies the incentive that governments may
have to compromise, despite a potentially strong defense of the merits of the
claim.187
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,188 a U.S. investor with a Canadian
subsidiary that operated softwood lumber mills in British Columbia filed a claim
against Canada in an UNCITRAL tribunal alleging that Canada’s
implementation of the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA)
violated its national treatment and minimum standard of treatment.189 Under the
ed., Hart Publishing 2001). Ethyl’s claim for $251,000,000 was the first significant claim involving a challenge
to an environmental regulation brought following adoption of the NAFTA. Id.
183
Id. ¶¶ 12–14. Canada argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the dispute as it is out of the
scope of Chapter 11 of NAFTA and that the claimant failed to fulfill requirements of Section B of Chapter 11.
Id. ¶ 12. Ethyl defended jurisdiction of the Tribunal by arguing that all the requirements of Chapter 11 for
arbitration procedure were met by the time of hearing. Id. ¶ 46. As for the scope of Chapter 11, the claimant
argued that it challenged measures against it within the territory of Canada for which it is entitled to
compensation, including for damages resulting from the act outside of Canada. Id. ¶ 27. The Tribunal agreed
with Ethyl that this argument was not critical enough to be decided on the procedural stage, and it did not reject
Ethyl’s claim on that ground. Id. ¶ 64. The Tribunal noted that the MMT Act was the realization of the
governmental program that had been sustained over a long period of time, and, in any event, by the time of
commencement of arbitration, the government had a “measure” adopted or maintained within the meaning of
Article 1101. Id. ¶ 69. Part of Ethyl’s claim was that the damages it had suffered included losses outside the
territory of Canada. Id. ¶ 72. The Tribunal joined Canada’s objections related to damages suffered outside of
Canada and to the trade nature of the dispute to the merits phase and rejected other objections. Id. ¶ 96.
184
See id. ¶ 21.
185
Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, http://www.
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/ethyl.aspx?lang=eng
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
186
Alan C. Swan, Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (under NAFTA/UNCITRAL), 94
AM. J. INT’L L. 159, 161 (2000).
187
See Ethyl Corp. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award On Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998),
38 I.L.M. 708, 722, ¶¶ 3–4 (1999).
188
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (Apr. 10, 2001),
40 ILM 258 (2001); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001).
189
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 105–06 (Apr.
10, 2001), 40 ILM 258. The claimant also argued for violations of Article 1106 (“Performance Requirements”)
and Article 1110 (“Expropriation”). Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, ¶¶ 45, 47, 81 (June 26,
2000), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001). The Tribunal rejected both claims. Id. ¶¶ 70–72, 76, 79. Although it agreed that
access to the U.S. market is a property interest covered by Article 1110, it found no expropriation, because the
degree of interference with the Investments’ business was not substantial enough to be qualified as expropriation.
Id. ¶¶ 96, 99, 102, 104. It should be noted that Pope & Talbot also originally alleged violation of MFN treatment,
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SLA, Canada agreed to charge a fee on exports of softwood lumber in excess of
a certain number of board feet.190 According to Pope & Talbot, Canada’s
allocation of a fee-free quota was unfair and inequitable.191 It argued that its
investment was subjected to threats, its reasonable requests for information were
denied, it incurred unreasonable expenses, and it suffered loss of reputation in
government circles.192 It also claimed that discriminatory treatment arose out of
transitional adjustment provisions, unfair allocation of quota related to
wholesale exports, inequitable reallocation of quota for British Columbia
companies, and Canada’s breach of administrative fairness.193
The Tribunal found a violation of the minimum standards of protection but
not of national treatment.194 It held that the administrative audit undertaken as
part of export control regulation, to verify Pope & Talbot’s quota, amounted to
denial of fair and equitable treatment.195 Regarding national treatment, after
concluding that Canada’s treatment of Pope & Talbot’s investment should be
compared with the treatment of other producers of softwood lumber in covered
provinces, it found that Canada’s policies for new entrants and fees did not
discriminate against the foreign investors.196 Pope & Talbot had claimed
damages totaling over $507 million (USD) and the Tribunal awarded it with
$461,566 (USD) in damages with interest on the findings of violation.197 It is
likely that, had the claimant prevailed in its national treatment claim, the
damages would have been higher.
One of Canada’s main defenses was that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction
because there was no “investment dispute” within the meaning of Article 1115
due to the fact that the dispute was related to trade in goods.198 Drawing on
interpretive practices for Article XX of the GATT, Canada claimed that its
measures did not relate to investment because “relate to” should be construed to

but this claim was dropped by the time the interim award was issued. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government
of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 39 (Apr. 10, 2001), 40 ILM 258.
190
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, ¶ 22 (June 26, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001).
191
Id. ¶ 150.
192
Id. ¶ 181.
193
Id. ¶¶ 122, 124, 126, 182.
194
Id. ¶¶ 88, 94–95, 118.
195
The Tribunal found that Canada particularly breached NAFTA in the course of the quota audit when it
asked Pope & Talbot to ship its Canadian company’s records back to Canada. Id. ¶¶ 160, 165, 171.
196
Id. ¶¶ 126–28.
197
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Diplomacy in Action: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada,
https://www.state.gov/s/l/c3747.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
198
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award by Arbitration Tribunal with Relation to
Preliminary Motion by Government of Canada (Jan. 26, 2000), ¶ 12(1), 40 I.L.M. 258 (2001).

AFILALO GALLEYPROOFS

494

5/29/2018 1:11 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

mean “primarily aimed at.”199 Therefore, Canada claimed, the impact of the SLA
and Canada’s export regime on an investor’s operations were not sufficient to
support the conclusion that the measures related to investment.200 The Tribunal,
however, concluded that all elements of a proper investment dispute were met;
with respect to the relationship between trade and investment, the Tribunal found
that Chapter 11’s reference to rules on the “treatment of investments with respect
to the management, conduct and operation of investments is wide enough to
relate to measures specifically directed at goods produced by a particular
investment.”201 This is exactly the point: investment and trade law deal with the
same activities. The WTO speaks to states about trade in goods and services,202
and BITs speak to the private economic actors carrying on trade.203
In many instances, the investor will also be able to claim an expropriation,
or a measure tantamount to an expropriation, going beyond the causes of action
permitted by domestic law under open-ended provisions of an IT.204 In Methanex
v. United States,205 for instance, a Canadian maker of methanol, which is
occasionally used as a gasoline additive, argued that the legislation lacked a
proper scientific basis and amounted to a complete deprivation of the right to do
business in California in violation of NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’s takings
rules.206 In Loewen v. United States,207 the claimant argued that a Mississippi
trial resulting in an enormous amount of punitive damages violated due process
norms, amounting to a taking of property.208 In both cases, the complainant
sought hundreds of millions of dollars in damages,209 and in both cases the

199

Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 28.
201
Id. ¶ 26.
202
See Marrakesh Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (establishing the WTO).
203
See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties# (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
204
See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M.
1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003).
205
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M.
1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005).
206
Id. ¶ 24.
207
The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
Notice of Claim, ¶ 16 (Oct. 30, 1998).
208
Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
209
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M.
1345, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Notice of Claim, ¶ 187 (Oct. 30, 1998).
200
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complainants did not even come close to having a domestic cause of action.210
While the arbitrators ultimately rejected those claims, all of the cases proceeded
to the awards stage, and a different panel may well have ruled in their favor.211
Even when the complainants are ultimately unsuccessful on the merits, the
overlap between trade and investment creates massive exposure of the defending
states to protracted litigation. The “plain packaging litigation” against Australia
illustrates this claim. On the investment front, Philip Morris Asia (PM Asia)
challenged Australia’s “plain packaging” laws212 under the Agreement between
the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments of 1993.213 The plain packaging laws
severely restricted the ability of a cigarette manufacturer to use its brand, logos,
or designs on a cigarette pack.214 They required that all cigarettes be sold under
plain, drab brown, unattractive packaging.215 They also prohibited the use of
graphics and logos on the package.216 In addition to the investment rules,
Australia’s plain packaging laws were challenged before the WTO by several
states, including the European Union, Brazil, Egypt, the Ukraine, Honduras, the
Dominican Republic, and New Zealand, among others.217

210
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 I.L.M.
1345, Part IV, ch. F, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v.
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Notice of Claim, ¶ 240 (Oct. 30, 1998).
211
See generally Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits,
44 I.L.M. 1345 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005); The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003).
212
Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 (Cth) and Trade Marks Amendment (Tobacco Plain Packaging)
Bill 2011 (Cth). See Philip Morris Asia Initiates Legal Action Against the Australian Government Over Plain
Packaging, WEB WIRE (June 27, 2011), https://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=140252.
213
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., Sept. 15, 1993, 1748
U.N.T.S. 385; Written Notification of Claim by Philip Morris Asia Limited to the Commonwealth of Australia
pursuant to Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments (July 15, 2011) [hereinafter Written Notification of Claim].
214
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.).
215
Id. § 19.
216
Id. ch. 1, § 4; id. ch. 2, § 20.
217
Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia–Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/1 (Mar.
15, 2012) [hereinafter Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Ukraine];
Request for Consultations by Honduras, Australia–Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10,
2012) [hereinafter Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Honduras];
Request for Consultations by the Dominican Republic, Australia–Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/1 (July 23, 2012) [hereinafter Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain
Packaging Requirements, Request by Dominican Republic].
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The main arguments of the complaining states before the DSB were brought
under the TBT and TRIPS. As to the TBT, the states claimed that the measures
amounted to a technical barrier to trade because they severely hindered sales of
branded cigarettes in Australia, and that they were more restrictive than
necessary to achieve Australia’s health objective.218 Depriving cigarette brand
owners of their normal packaging, logos, and branding, they claimed, will hurt
their sales but will not decrease smoking significantly.219 Instead of
distinguishing the products by branding habits, smokers would do so through
product pricing.220 In turn, this would favor cheaper, domestic cigarettes, using
lesser quality tobacco.221 As to TRIPS, the complainants argued that Australia’s
measures thwarted the right of cigarette makers to use their brand for customary
product identification purposes, thereby depriving them of the normal benefits
of a trademark registration.222
The investment filings by PM Asia followed a similar structure and,
additionally, raised investment-specific causes of action.223 PM Asia was
incorporated in Hong Kong with the goal of benefitting from the Hong Kong–
Australia treaty, and it owned shares in Philip Morris Australia Limited (PM
Australia) as its “investment” in Australia.224 PM Asia argued that Australia
expropriated its valuable intellectual property by banning the normal use of a
trademark to brand intellectual property on tobacco products and packaging.225
It also claimed a violation of the minimum standards of treatment of
international investment law on the grounds that Australia violated international
treaties such as the TBT and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property.226 PM Asia translated its trade claims into investment language by
arguing that, when it chose to do business in Australia, it had a legitimate
expectation that Australia would abide by its obligations under international
economic law.227 By rejecting and failing to abide by those obligations, PM Asia
claimed that Australia deprived it of basic assumptions upon which its

218
See Australia–Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Dominican Republic,
supra note 217.
219
See Written Notification of Claim, supra note 213.
220
See id.
221
See Request for Consultations by the Dominican Republic, supra note 217.
222
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL, ¶ 39
(Nov. 21, 2011).
223
Id. ¶ 1.2.
224
Id. ¶ 1.3.
225
Id. ¶¶ 7.3–7.5.
226
Id. ¶¶ 7.6–7.8.
227
Id. ¶ 6.5.

AFILALO GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

5/29/2018 1:11 PM

FAILED BOUNDARIES

497

investment in that country relied.228 As a result of the violations, PM Asia
alleged it was entitled to compensation “in an amount to be quantified but of the
order of billions of Australian dollars.”229
In both the arbitral claim and the WTO proceeding, the tribunal sided with
Australia and held that Philip Morris treaty-shopped to bring a baseless
complaint about the exercise of legitimate regulatory power that had been in the
works for a substantial amount of time. 230 Australia’s massive legal efforts to
defend the case, the length of years it lasted, and the staggering exposure in the
event of a loss ($15 billion AUS) illustrate the sensitivity of allowing challenges
of this type to proceed to arbitration.231 Treaty-shopping, a longstanding
participation of PM in regulatory preparations for harsher tobacco measures, and
the sensitive health concerns at issue, made it a case where the investor had a
low likelihood of success. More sympathetic plaintiffs may be able to prove
legitimate expectations and an actionable breach of international law in cases
where a state has changed its domestic policies or law.
In another case, the investment tribunal may strike a different balance
between investor expectations and the state’s regulatory space to change course.
Line drawing is a delicate exercise, and the location of the boundary will depend
on the factual circumstances, individual philosophies, and predilections of the
arbitrators.232 There will be plenty of instances where the investor, in a case that
overlaps trade and the applicable investment treaty, will be able to prove a

228

Id. ¶¶ 6.2–6.12, 45.
Id. ¶ 8.3.
230
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, 25, 47–50, Australia’s Response to the
Notice of Arbitration, UNCITRAL, ¶ 48 (Dec. 21, 2011).
231
See Valentina S. Vadi, Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark Protection v. Tobacco
Control in International Investment Law, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 93, 128 (2012) (discussing the chilling effect of
investment treaties and reporting case studies to the effect that, unless properly limited by jurisprudence,
“investment treaty guarantees may negatively affect tobacco control policies as investors may claim that tobacco
control measures infringe their rights”); see also Wagner, supra note 48.
232
See, e.g., William T. Waren, Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United States and NAFTA
Investor Rights, 31 E.L.R. 10986. Methanex illustrates the “risk to States” because, “[g]iven the largely
undefined standards of NAFTA’s investment chapter, the arbitrators have room to read its language broadly or
narrowly.” Id. International Thunderbird, which involved a ruling granted by a Mexican government agency
allowing Thunderbird to operate its gaming machines in Mexico as “games of skill” rather than prohibited games
of “chance,” provides an excellent illustration of the risk faced by states. International Thunderbird Gaming
Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, ¶ 102 (Dec. 2005). When its ruling was
canceled, Thunderbird challenged the adverse government action under NAFTA. Id. The majority took the view
that Thunderbird had assumed the risk of a reversal of government policy, whereas the dissent argued that
Mexico had provided sufficiently strong assurances to the investor to create legitimate expectations, and it would
allocate the risk to the State. Id. The different outcomes are direct results of the arbitrators’ exercise of their
discretion to evaluate how much regulatory space the defending State has to change policy course. Id.
229
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breach.233 Consider, for example, the separate opinion filed by a dissenting
arbitrator in International Thunderbird:
Throughout the extensive jurisprudence surveyed, we find that if
governments reverse their previously communicated and relied upon
course, a balancing process takes place between the strength of
legitimate expectations (stronger if an investment for the future has
been committed) and the very legitimate goal of retaining “policy
space” and governmental flexibility.234

This arbitrator strongly held that the balancing in that case favored the
complainants, while his colleagues sheltered the regulatory space that he
described.235
In Part III, I show, applying my hypothetical investment treaty provisions,
how the overlap between trade and investment results in the “capture” by the
investment treaty of most WTO cases.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
A. A Few More Introductory Comments on Classification
I have reviewed both decided trade cases and cases that were settled before
reaching the Panel or AB stage. I grouped cases either by industry or by subject
matter. Food, liquor, automotive, clean energies, textiles, tobacco, and other
industries have been the focus of multiple WTO filings. Patent, trademark, and
like cases are better categorized by subject matter (intellectual property). Some
cases did not fall readily into one category or another and are included in a
“General Market Access” catch-all category. My categorization judgments, I
believe, fulfill the purpose of the exercise, which is to show that in every major
group of WTO cases discussed in this Article, there is a strong likelihood that a
parallel cause of action is available.

233
As this Article demonstrates, there is a near-perfect correlation between national treatment for trade
and for investment. See generally Afilalo, supra note 15 (setting forth the theoretical argument that this Article
proves empirically).
234
International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award,
UNCITRAL/NAFTA, ¶ 102 (Dec. 2005) (separate opinion of Thomas Wälde).
235
Id. ¶ 5 (“[The arbitrators in the majority] see the glass of the investor half empty, I rather see it as half
full. They imply a very high level of due diligence, of knowledge of local conditions and of government risk to
be taken by the investor. I rather see the government as responsible for providing a clear message and of sticking
to the message once given and as reasonably understood by the investor.”).
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In determining whether to classify a case as Trade Positive, Investment
Positive, or Potentially Positive, I kept in mind the purpose of this first stage of
my project: determining the extent to which a legitimate cause of action under
investment law may arise from the same core operative facts as the trade cases.
I did not seek to argue conclusively whether the investment case would be
successful if brought to completion. As the International Thunderbird dissent
shows, different panels of arbitrators may reach different results based on their
general understanding of the purpose of investment law.236 Also, many trade
cases did not go beyond the request for consultations stage and did not include
a fully developed record.237 This made it difficult to predict with accuracy how
a panel would rule on either the trade or investment side.
I placed myself in the observation point of a summary judgment tribunal
determining not only whether sufficient facts were in dispute to proceed to trial,
but also whether the ultimate decision maker may find a legal violation
depending on his or her conclusions as to a legal standard that is in a state of
flux and is, thus, uncertain. In making judgments as to individual cases, I tried
to strike a balance between over-caution and enthusiastically piling up Positives.
Both extremes may have skewed the analysis, either towards finding less of a
correlation than actually exists or more.
To avoid those tendencies, I adhered to the following principles and
guidelines. First, to be Trade Positive, the WTO proceedings must have either
(i) resulted in a ruling in favor of the claimant, or (ii) if the case was resolved
before a Panel or Appellate Body ruling, stood a good chance of being decided
in favor of the claimant under established principles of WTO law accepting as
true the allegations made in the request for consultations. Second, I considered
all cases that involve sensitive issues of state sovereignty—even if the WTO
chose or would likely choose to uphold the complainants’ interests in the face of
the sovereignty issues—as serious candidates for a downgrade to Investment
Potentially Positive or Negative status. I assumed that an arbitral tribunal
awarding monetary damages to a private party in a proceeding against a state
will be even more sensitive to concerns of conflicting state policies than a WTO
Panel or the Appellate Body. Third, and conversely, I have not hesitated to
classify cases as Investment Positive where the allegations of protectionism are
not counterbalanced by any legitimate state interest that appears on the available

236

Id. ¶ 8.
See, e.g., cases cited infra at notes 242–49. The tables setting forth the cases reviewed for purposes of
this project will illustrate the extent to which a substantial number of filings do not go beyond the Request for
Consultations stage.
237
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record, or when the case appears to raise familiar allegations of economic
protectionism unrelated to any trade-legitimate state interest.
The majority of cases that were presented to the WTO did not involve
extraordinary conflicts between national interests and international trade. As
trade students, we tend to focus on the difficult, borderline cases that raise the
most interesting and provocative issues. The actual review of the cases, however,
tells a different narrative. It reflects the leaps and bounds through which the
world’s economies have become gradually intertwined and the barriers that
world trade has broken down to get there.
B. The Liquor Cases
Most students of trade will read at least a few liquor cases. A highly lucrative
industry, it is also home to cultural biases and stereotypes. For example, the
French drink wine while the Brits will not take a wine cooler to Old Trafford,
even if they were paid to do so. The Japanese will not switch from shochu to
vodka, even though the liquids look quite similar. Neither will the Chileans turn
away from pisco, nor the Koreans from soju. Yet, all liquor cases are easy to
classify as Trade Positives. Time and again, the WTO has received notifications
and/or adjudicated complaints that a contracting party crafted taxation or
regulation that discriminated against foreign liquor in favor of a popular brand
of alcohol.238
These cases resulted or would result if adjudicated in a violation of
international trade rules principally because they tend to share the following
hallmarks. First, they do not implicate weighty concerns of national sovereignty.
In fact, they may not implicate any concern other than the protection of domestic
liquor (wine in France, beer in England, shochu in Japan, soju in Korea, etc.)
that local consumers have a habit of using and that are culturally associated with
the defending states. Second, the taxation or regulation scheme, although drafted
neutrally from a formal standpoint (e.g., imposing a higher tax based on
manufacturing processes but not naming the foreign liquor made by these
processes), has a substantially disparate impact on the foreign liquor. There is
no doubt that, when the tax is applied to domestic and foreign categories of
products, the foreign product is discriminated against de facto. Third, consumer
preferences fall squarely on the side of the domestic liquor. However, the
taxation or regulation providing it with more favorable competitive conditions

238
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages AB Report].
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may have calcified the choice by making it financially logical and creating a
habit of purchase. Mexicans might drink tequila and the French may sip wine,
but they might shift in time to foreign liquor if the prices are equalized. (Who
would have thought four decades ago that wine bars would become popular in
London?) The trade tribunals’ job is to create the legal playing field to unleash
those forces of integration. Fourth, the likeness analysis under the WTO/GATT
may involve formal differences between the products at issue (e.g., their alcohol
content), their use as digestives as opposed to cocktails, or the manufacturing
processes or raw materials used, but it will not be conclusive. Similarly, because
of the cultural biases, the consumer preferences analysis may show definitive
results as to the tastes of the consumer at a given point in time. However, the
structural price discrimination underlying the preference will make these
findings inconclusive because the trade tribunal will not know the extent to
which historical pricing differentials drove tastes and if changes in pricing will
transform the market and level the playing field.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that the cases are all Trade Positive and
Investment Positive:
Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverage–Shochu239

TP

IP

Korea—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages–Soju240

TP

IP

DS 87 & DS 110: Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages–
Pisco241

TP

IP

DS 261: Uruguay—Tax Treatment on Certain Products242

TP

IP

DS 263: European Communities—Measures Affecting the
Import of Wine243

TP

IP

239
Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/D11/R (October 4, 1996).
240
Appellate Body Report, Korea–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R,
(October 18, 1999).
241
Appellate Body Report, Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R
(Dec. 13, 1999); Request for Consultations by the United States, Chile–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO
Doc. WT/DS109/1 (Dec. 16, 1997).
242
Request for Consultations by Chile, Uruguay–Tax Treatment on Certain Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS261/1 (June 2, 2002).
243
Request for Consultations by Argentina, European Communities–Measures Affecting Imports of Wine,
WTO Doc. WT/DS263/1 (Sept. 12, 2002).
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DS 352: India—Measures Affecting the Importation and
Sale of Wines and Spirits from the European
Communities244

TP

IP

DS 354: Canada—Tax Exemptions and Reductions for
Wine and Beer245

TP

IP

Thailand—Customs Valuation of Certain Products from
the European Communities

TP

IP

DS 380: India—Certain Taxes and Other Measures on
Imported Wines and Spirits246

TP

IP

DS 396 & DS 403: Philippines—Taxes on Distilled
Spirits247

TP

IP

DS 411: Armenia—Measures Affecting the Importation
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes and Alcoholic Beverages248

TP

IP

DS 423: Ukraine—Taxes on Distilled Spirits249

TP

IP

One compelling reason for these outcomes is that, absent countervailing
sovereignty concerns of sufficient import, the measure at issue can only be
characterized as protectionist, culturally biased, or otherwise squarely running
counter to the WTO’s ethos. The trade tribunals of the WTO, much like their
counterparts in the European Union or other free trade areas and customs unions,
will seek to level the competitive field by declaring measures based on cultural
stereotypes that became enshrined in national preferences to be tradeinconsistent.250 The removal of the disadvantageous competitive conditions will
244
Request for Consultations by the European Community, India–Measures Affecting the Importation
and Sale of Wines and Spirits from the European Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS352/1 (Nov. 23, 2006).
245
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Canada–Tax Exemptions and Reductions for
Wine and Beer, WTO Doc. WT/DS354/1 (Dec. 4, 2006).
246
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, India–Certain Taxes and Other Measures
on Imported Wines and Spirits, WT/DS380/1 (Nov. 18, 2009).
247
Appellate Body Report, Philippines–Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS396/AB/R, WT/DS403/AB/R
(Dec. 21, 2011).
248
Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Armenia–Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale
of Cigarettes and Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS411/1 (July 22, 2010).
249
Request for Consultations by Moldova, Ukraine–Taxes on Distilled Spirits, WT/DS423/1 (Mar. 7,
2011).
250
See, e.g., Joshua Aizenmann & Eileen L. Brooks, Globalization and Taste Convergence: The Case of
Wine and Beer, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11228, 2005) (finding a high degree of
convergence of consumption of wine relative to beer within groups of countries that have a higher degree of
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in turn enable foreign liquor to gradually gain access to domestic markets and
transform national preferences.251
Similarly, all liquor cases examined are also Investment Positive, creating a
perfect correlation between investment and trade possible outcomes. All cases
involved differential taxation on liquors, which could be contested by the model
IT under several grounds. First, measures that were in violation with National
Treatment provisions under trade law would also be in violation with National
Treatment provisions in ITs.252 In addition, investors could argue that the
measures carried out by the state constitute manifest injustice and arbitrary
treatment. Finally, investors could also rely on the minimum standards of
treatment provisions to argue they had a legitimate expectation that the host state
would comply with its obligations under international law.
C. Cigarettes and Related Products
The outcomes of these cases are summarized in the table below:
DS 227: Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes253

TP

IPP

DS 232: Mexico—Measures Affecting the Import of
Matches254

TP

IP

TP

IPP

DS 302: Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting
the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes255

integration and that a “key prediction of international trade is confirmed in the data: greater trade integration
weakens the association between production and consumption patterns”).
251
Id.
252
This is because, as has been noted ever since the early days of the WTO, in a typical liquor case, the
challenged taxes are “offensive because the tax distinctions [a]re unsupported by any objective basis . . . no aim
other than protectionism explain[s] the tax distinctions.” James H. Snelson, Can GATT Article III Recover from
its Head-On Collision with United States – Taxes on Automobiles, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 467, 472 n. 37
(1996). As explained above, the absence of a colorable domestic purpose will doom a measure under both trade
and investment laws.
253
Request for Consultations by Chile, Peru–Taxes on Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS227/1 (Mar. 6,
2001) [hereinafter Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes].
254
Request for Consultations by Chile, Mexico–Measures Affecting the Import of Matches, WTO Doc.
WT/DS232/1 (May 28, 2001).
255
Request for Consultations by Honduras, Dominican Republic–Measures Affecting the Importation of
Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS300/1 (Sept. 3, 2003); Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic Measures
Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS302/AB/R (Apr. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Dominican Republic—Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes].
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DS 371: Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on
Cigarettes from the Philippines256

TP

IP

DS 406: United States—Measures Affecting the
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes257

TP

IPP

DS 434; DS 435; DS 441 Australia—Plain
Packaging258

TN

IN

This category of cases borrows some of the features of the Liquor Cases and
the Food Cases described below. Some of the Cigarette Cases reflect a
straightforward desire to protect a profitable domestic cigarette industry, much
like the domestic liquor industry tended to elicit protectionism from
government.259 Other proceedings implicate legitimate health concerns, and yet,
the science or the effectiveness of the measure taken by each State may be
sufficiently contested to allow room for a strong argument that the measure
should not outweigh the trade system’s interest in free movement of goods
applying familiar principles of trade law. Peru, for example, blatantly tried to
protect its own cigarettes by distinguishing between cigarettes based on the
number of countries in which they are sold.260 The Peru case presented vastly
different concerns than the plain packaging law proceedings where, after years
of debate, Australia decided to adopt an extreme ban on attractive cigarette
advertisements.261 Standing in the middle of these two poles, we find cases like
the Clove Cigarette proceedings where the United States selectively targeted
flavored cigarettes by banning clove cigarettes but not menthols.262 The Peru
and United States cases fell in the Trade Positive side of the divides. I found
sufficient evidence of protectionism, evaluated by the absence of a rational,
256
Appellate Body Report, Thailand–Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines,
WTO Doc. WT/DS371/AB/R (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Thailand—Cigarettes from the Phillipines].
257
Panel Report, United States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO
Doc. WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter United States–Clove Cigarettes]; Appellate Body Report, United
States–Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4,
2017).
258
Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Ukraine, supra note 217;
Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by Honduras, supra note 217;
Australia—Trademarks, Geographical Indications, and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by
Dominican Republic, supra note 217.
259
See, e.g., Dominican Republic–Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, supra note 255; Thailand–
Cigarettes from the Philippines, supra note 256.
260
Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note 253.
261
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, supra note 214; Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements, supra note 217.
262
United States—Clove Cigarettes, supra note 257.
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health-based justification for the measure at issue, to classify Peru in the
Investment Positive side of the divide as well, and I classified the Cloves
Cigarettes controversy as a Potentially Positive investment outcome because it
involved a fair dose of unjustified discrimination between foreign and imported
products, mixed with a legitimate health interests.
Except for the Australia plain packaging case, discussed above, none of the
cases examined are Investment Negative or Trade Negative.263 They all present
a reasonable basis for investment arbitration claims and trade disputes, though
to different extents. While some cases involved clear protectionist measures and
were labeled both Investment Positive and Trade Positive,264 a couple cases
involving cigarettes and related products present compelling health
considerations and were therefore labeled as Investment Potentially Positive—
though they were all Trade Positive.265
D. Food Cases
I grouped all food-centered cases, including agricultural products such as
bovine hides and soft drinks, in one category. Food Cases have abounded in the
WTO,266 and the narrative of the filings shows a clear trend towards unjustified
discrimination.267 The Food Cases read like a manual for protectionist measures.
Countries have denied foreign products the right to use appellations commonly
known by local consumers.268 Governments barred the import of food products
263
Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, supra note 217; Australia—
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, supra note 217; Australia—Trademarks, Geographical
Indications, and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, supra note 217.
264
See Peru—Taxes on Cigarettes, supra note 253; Mexico - Measures Affecting the Import of Matches,
supra note 254; Thailand—Cigarettes from the Philippines, supra note 256.
265
See Dominican Republic—Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, supra note 255; United States—
Clove Cigarettes, supra note 257; Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by
Ukraine, supra note 217; Australia—Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements, Request by
Honduras, supra note 217; Australia—Trademarks, Geographical Indications, and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements, supra note 217.
266
Dispute Settlement – Index of Disputed Issues, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/English/
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
267
See, e.g., Request for Consultations by the United States, Australia—Measures Affecting the
Importation of Salmonids, WTO Doc. WT/DS21/1 (Nov. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Australia—Measures Affecting
the Importation of Salmonids]; Request for Consultations by the United States, Korea—Measures Concerning
Inspection of Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS41/1 (May 31, 1996) [hereinafter Korea—Measures
Concerning Inspection of Agricultural Products]; Request for Consultations from Canada, United States—
Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS144/1 (Sept.
29, 1998) [hereinafter United States—Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from
Canada].
268
See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Scallops, WTO Doc.
WT/DS7/R (Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter European Communities—Trade Description of Scallops].
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suspected of creating health risks even though the countries of export were
disease-free.269 Ports have been shut down to foreign imports, and the
governments artificially created inspection measures for the express purpose of
slowing down the import of foreign goods.270 Alternatively creative or
predictably protective in crafting measures, governments have worked hard at
protecting their domestic food sectors.271 All of these clear cases are classified
as both Investment Positive and Trade Positive.
Some Food Cases will raise legitimate issues of health, consumer safety, or
other domestic concerns. These cases could implicate not only obvious dangers
like foot-and-mouth disease or mad cow disease, but also production techniques
like those involving genetically modified organisms or hormones that may
create risks for the consumer.272 In those instances, the science may not be
definitive, and the trade tribunal will have to determine whether the measure at
issue, assuming it has a sufficiently pronounced disparate impact on the foreign
product, amounts to an unjustified denial of national treatment.273 If the measure
applies neutrally and does not violate national treatment, the DSB will still have
to analyze whether it violates the SPS because of an insufficient scientific basis
for applying it.274 For those cases, where there is a genuine and substantial
question as to health or other domestic purposes of the regulation at issue, or
where a non-discrimination rationale applies on the trade side, I have determined
the Investment outcome using the factors described above and seriously
269
See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—Measures Affecting
Imports of Poultry Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS100/1 (Aug. 25, 1997) [hereinafter United States—Measures
Affecting Imports of Poultry Products]; Request for Consultations by Switzerland, Slovak Republic—Measures
Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and the Transit of Cattle, WTO Doc. WT/DS133/1 (May 18,
1998) [hereinafter Slovak Republic—Measures Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and the Transit
of Cattle].
270
See United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry Products, supra note 269; Slovak
Republic—Measures Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and the Transit of Cattle, supra note 269.
271
Request for Consultations by Argentina, United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of Groundnuts,
WTO Doc. WT/DS111/1 (Jan. 8, 1998) [hereinafter United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of
Groundnuts]; Request for Consultations by the United States, Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf-Life of
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS5/1 (May 5, 1995) [hereinafter Korea—Measures Concerning Bottled Water];
Request for Consultation by Canada, Korea—Measures Concerning Bottled Water, WTO Doc. WT/DS20/1
(Nov. 22, 1995).
272
James Andrews, Imports and Exports: The Global Beef Trade, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/imports-and-exports-the-beef-trade/#.Wf0rWmiPI54; Donna Roberts
& Laurian Unnevehr, Resolving Trade Disputes Arising from Trends in Food Safety Regulation: The Role of the
Multilateral Governance Framework, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOOD SAFETY: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND
CASE STUDIES 28, 29–30 (Jean C. Buzby ed., 2003).
273
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
493, art. 5, ¶ 7; Roberts & Unnevehr, supra note 272.
274
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
493, art. 5, ¶¶ 6, 8.
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considered Investment Negative classification—and at the very least
downgraded the case to a Potentially Positive, regardless of whether the WTO
has or might have ruled in favor of the complainant.
The outcomes of the Food Cases are summarized in the following table:
DS 3: Korea—Measures Concerning the Testing and
Inspection of Agricultural Products275
DS 5: Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf-Life of
Products276
DS 7: European Communities—Trade Description of
Scallops277
DS 18: Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon278
DS 20: Korea—Measures Concerning the Bottled Water279
DS 21: Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Salmonids280
DS 26 & 48: European Communities—EC Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)281
DS 41: Korea—Measures Concerning Inspection of
Agricultural Products282
DS 58: United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products283
DS 72: European Communities—Measures Affecting Butter
Products284
DS 74: Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry285

TN
TP

IN
IP

TP

IP

TP

IP

TP
TP

IP
IP

TN

IPP

TN

IN

TP
TP

IPP
IP

TP

IP

275
Request for Consultations by the United States, Korea—Measures Concerning the Testing and
Inspection of Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS3/1 (Apr. 4, 1995).
276
Korea—Measures Concerning the Shelf Life of Products, supra note 271.
277
European Communities—Trade Description of Scallops, supra note 268.
278
Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc.
WT/DS18/AB/R (adopted Oct. 20, 1998).
279
Korea—Measures Concerning Bottled Water, supra note 271.
280
Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmonids, supra note 267.
281
Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998).
282
Korea—Measures Concerning Inspection of Agricultural Products, supra note 267.
283
Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
284
Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Butter Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS72/R
(adopted Nov. 24, 1999).
285
Request for Consultations by the United States, Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry,
WTO Doc. WT/DS74/1 (Apr. 7, 1997).
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DS 76: Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products286
DS 100: United States—Measures Affecting Imports of
Poultry Products287
DS 102: Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry288
DS 105: European Communities—Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas289
DS 107: Pakistan—Export Measures Affecting Hides and
Skins290
DS 111: United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of
Groundnuts291
DS 120: India—Measures Affecting Export of Certain
Commodities292
DS 133: Slovak Republic—Measures Concerning the
Importation of Dairy Products and the Transit of Cattle293
DS 134: European Communities—Restrictions on Certain
Import Duties on Rice294
DS 143: Slovak Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on
Wheat from Hungary295
DS 144: United States—Certain Measures Affecting the
Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada296
DS 148: Czech Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on
Wheat from Hungary297
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TP
TP

IPP
IPP

TP

IP

TP
TP

IP
IP

TP

IP

TP

IP

TP
TP

IP
IP

TP

IP

TP

IPP

TP

IP

286
Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS76/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 1999).
287
United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry Products, supra note 269.
288
Request for Consultation by United States, Philippines—Measures Affecting Pork and Poultry, WTO
Doc. WT/DS102/1 (Oct. 9, 1997).
289
Request for Consultation by Panama, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WTO Doc. WT/DS105/1 (Oct. 29, 1997).
290
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Pakistan—Export Measures Affecting Hides
and Skins, WTO Doc. WT/DS107/1 (Nov. 20, 1997).
291
United States—Tariff Rate Quota for Imports of Groundnuts, supra note 271.
292
Request for Consultations from the European Communities, India—Measures Affecting Export of
Certain Commodities, WTO Doc. WT/DS120/1 (Mar. 23, 1998).
293
Slovak Republic—Measures Concerning the Importation of Dairy Products and Transit of Cattle, supra
note 269.
294
Request for Consultations by India, European Communities—Restrictions on Certain Import Duties on
Rice, WTO Doc. WT/DS134/1 (June 8, 1998).
295
Request for Consultations from Hungary, Slovak Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on Wheat
from Hungary, WTO Doc. WT/DS143/1 (Sept. 21, 1998).
296
United States—Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada, supra
note 267.
297
Request for Consultations from Hungary, Czech Republic—Measure Affecting Import Duty on Wheat
from Hungary, WTO Doc. WT/DS148/1 (Oct. 15, 1998).
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DS 154: European Communities—Measures Affecting
Differential and Favourable Treatment of Coffee298
DS 155: Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine
Hides and the Import of Finished Leather299
DS 161 & 169: Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef300
DS 193: Chile—Measures Affecting the Transit and
Importation of Swordfish301
DS 205: Egypt—Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with
Soybean Oil302
DS 209: European Communities—Measures Affecting Soluble
Coffee303
DS 231: European Communities—Trade Description of
Sardines304
DS 237: Turkey—Certain Import Procedures for Fresh Fruit305
DS 240: Romania—Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat
Flour306
DS 245: Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples307
DS 250: United States—Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by
Florida on Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products308

509

TP

IPP

TP

IPP

TP
TP

IP
IP

TP

IPP

TP

IP

TP

IP

TP
TP

IP
IP

TP

IPP

TP

IP

298
Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities—Measures Affecting Differential and
Favourable Treatment of Coffee, WTO Doc. WT/DS154/1 (Dec. 11, 1998).
299
Panel Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished
Leather, WTO Doc. WT/DS155/R (adopted December 19, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Argentina-Bovine Hides and
Finished Leather Panel Report].
300
Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO
Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000).
301
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Chile—Measures Affecting the Transit and
Importation of Swordfish, WTO Doc. WT/DS193/4 (June 3, 2010).
302
Request for Consultations by Thailand, Egypt—Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil,
WTO Doc. WT/DS205/1 (Sept. 27, 2000).
303
Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Communities—Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee,
WTO Doc. WT/DS209/1 (Oct. 19, 2000).
304
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WTO Doc.
WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Sept. 26, 2002).
305
Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Turkey—Certain Import Procedures for Fresh Fruit, WTO Doc.
WT/DS237/1 (Sept. 10, 2001).
306
Request for Consultations by Hungary, Romania—Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat Flour,
WTO Doc. WT/DS240/1 (Nov. 17, 2001).
307
Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Doc.
WT/DS245/AB/R (adopted Nov. 26, 2003).
308
Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on
Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS250/1 (Mar. 26, 2002).

AFILALO GALLEYPROOFS

510

5/29/2018 1:11 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

DS 255: Peru—Tax Treatment on Certain Imported
Products309
DS 256: Turkey—Import Ban on Pet Food from Hungary310
DS 270 & 271: Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the
Importation of Fruits and Vegetables311
DS 275: Venezuela—Import Licensing Measures on Certain
Agricultural Products312
DS 276: Canada—Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain313
DS 279: India—Import Restrictions Maintained Under the
Export and Import Policy 2002–2007314
DS 284: Mexico—Certain Measures Preventing the Importation
of Black Beans from Nicaragua 315
DS 287: Australia—Quarantine Regime for Imports316
DS 297: Croatia—Measure Affecting Imports of Live Animals
and Meat Products317
DS 308: Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages318
DS 334: Turkey—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Rice319
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309
Request for Consultations by Chile, Peru—Tax Treatment on Certain Imported Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS255/1 (Apr. 29, 2002).
310
Request for Consultations by Hungary, Turkey—Import Ban on Pet Food from Hungary, WTO Doc.
WT/DS256/1 (May 7, 2002).
311
Request for Consultations by the Philippines, Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the Importation
of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables, WTO Doc. WT/DS270/1 (Oct. 23, 2002); Request for Consultations by the
Philippines, Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the Importation of Fresh Pineapple, WTO Doc.
WT/DS271/1 (Oct. 23, 2002).
312
Request for Consultations by the United States, Venezuela—Import Licensing Measures on Certain
Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS4275/1 (Nov. 12, 2002).
313
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported
Grain, WTO Doc. WT/DS276/AB/R (adopted Aug. 30, 2004).
314
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, India—Import Restrictions Maintained
Under the Export and Import Policy 2002–2007, WTO Doc. WT/279/1 (Jan. 9, 2003).
315
Request for Consultations by Nicaragua, Mexico—Certain Measures Preventing the Importation of
Black Beans from Nicaragua, WTO Doc. WT/DS284/1 (Mar. 20, 2003).
316
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Australia—Quarantine Regime for Imports,
WTO Doc. WT/DS287/1 (Apr. 9, 2003).
317
Request for Consultations by Hungary, Croatia—Measure Affecting Imports of Live Animals and Meat
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS297/1 (July 14, 2003).
318
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, supra note 156.
319
Panel Report, Turkey—Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice, WTO Doc. WT/DS334/R (adopted
Sept. 21, 2007).
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DS 367: Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples from New Zealand320
DS 369: European Communities—Certain Measures
Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products321
DS 381: United States—Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products
(United States Tuna II)322
DS 384 & 386: United States—Certain Country of Origin
Labeling (COOL) Requirements323
DS 389: European Communities—Certain Measures Affecting
Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United
States324
DS 391: Korea—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Bovine Meat and Meat Products from Canada325
DS 392: United States—Certain Measures Affecting
Imports of Poultry from China326
DS 400 & 401: European Communities—Measures
Prohibiting Importation and Marketing of Seal Products327
DS 430: India—Measures Concerning the Importation of
Certain Agricultural Products328
DS 447: United States—Measures Affecting the Importation
of Animals, Meat and Other Animal Products from
Argentina329
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320
Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand,
WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R (adopted Nov. 29, 2010).
321
Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—Certain Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS369/1 (Oct. 1, 2007).
322
Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2012).
323
Appellate Body Reports, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements,
WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (adopted June 29,2012).
324
Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities—Certain Measures Affecting
Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS389/1 (Jan. 20, 2009).
325
Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting the Importation of Bovine Meat and Meat Products from
Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS391/R (adopted July 3, 2012).
326
Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, WTO Doc.
WT/DS392/R (adopted Sept. 29, 2010).
327
Appellate Body Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted May 22, 2014).
328
Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS430/AB/R (adopted June 4, 2015).
329
Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Importation of Animals, Meat and Other Animal
Products from Argentina, WTO Doc. WT/DS447/R (adopted July 24, 2015).
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DS 448: United States—Measures Affecting the Importation of
Fresh Lemons330
DS 455: Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products,
Animal and Animal Products331
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IP

TP

IP

E. Automobile and Gasoline Cases
I grouped all cases involving the automobile industry into one category. I
also included the cases “Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline” and
“Retreaded Tyres” because of their connection to the car industry.332 All of these
cases fall in the Trade Positive—Investment Positive category with the
exception of the “Retreaded Tyres” and the “Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline” cases.333 This outcome is not surprising given the traditional
incentives to protect the automobile industry. This industry has had a relatively
high rate of unionization in industrialized countries.334 The industry has
created numerous skilled and semi-skilled jobs, and the outsourcing of
component parts or assembly is common.335 Component parts may be subject
to a separate duty, thereby creating gaming opportunities.336
At the same time, the industry involves obvious environmental and resource
conservation concerns.337 Cars may be more eco-friendly if built with gasoline

330
Request for Consultations by Argentina, United States—Measures Affecting the Importation of Fresh
Lemons, WTO Doc. WT/DS448/1 (Sept. 5, 2012).
331
Request for Consultations by the United States, Indonesia—Importation of Horticultural Products,
Animals and Animal products, WTO Doc. WT/DS455/1 (Jan. 14, 2013).
332
Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc.
WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Retreaded Tyres]; Appellate Body Report, United
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29,
1996) [hereinafter Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline].
333
Retreaded Tyres, supra note 332; Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 332.
334
See William Serrin, Shrinking U.A.W. Tries to Steer a Steady Course Through Troubled Time, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/us/shrinking-uaw-tries-to-steer-a-steady-coursethrough-troubled-times.html.
335
JOEL CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD ET AL., THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF THE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY
20 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. 2015); Rick Haglund, Auto Future: A Bounty of Jobs and Opportunity for Skilled Workers,
THE BRIDGE (July 24, 2013), http://www.bridgemi.com/economy/auto-future-bounty-jobs-and-opportunityskilled-workers.
336
JEFFREY WILLIAMS ET AL., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS 34 (Int’l Trade Admin.
2016).
337
John Mikler, The International Car Industry And Environmental Sustainability: Moving Beyond
Green-Washing?, SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE ROUND TABLE 125–27 (CSIRO 2004). The car
industry is a major contributor to pollution on a worldwide basis and a prime candidate for regulatory
intervention to internalize externalities. Id.; see also J. Sutherland et al., A Global Perspective on the
Environmental Challenges Facing the Automotive Industry: State-Of-The-Art and Directions for the Future, 35
INT’L J. VEHICLE DESIGN 86 (2004).
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consumption and other environmentally relevant considerations in mind, or they
may be built more “ego-friendly” and may be subjected to stricter regulation or
higher levels of taxation, like luxury cars with a high rate of gasoline
consumption. This variation might create an incentive for governments to
regulate in the name of environmental or resource conservation concerns, which
could either amount to a disguised restriction or be insufficiently strong to justify
the restriction on trade. The Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline case
exemplifies this possibility, but I downgraded it to Potentially Positive on the
investment side because of the domestic sensitivities associated with the
resource conservation aspects of the measure discussed below.
The outcomes of these cases are set forth in the table below:
DS 42: United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline338

TP

IPP

DS 54, 55, 59 & 64: Indonesia—Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry339

TP

IP

DS 139 & 142: Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry340

TP

IP

DS 146 & 175: India—Measures Affecting the Automotive
Sector341

TP

IP

DS 195: Philippines—Measures Affecting Trade and
Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector342

TP

IP

DS 332: Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres343

TP

IPP

338

Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 332.
Panel Reports, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc.
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (adopted July 2, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 IndonesiaAutomobile Industry Panel Report].
340
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WTO Doc.
WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (adopted May 31, 2000).
341
Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WTO Doc.
WT/DS146/AB/R, WT/DS175/AB/R (adopted Mar. 19, 2002).
342
Request for Consultations by the United States, Philippines—Measures Affecting Trade and Investment
in the Motor Vehicle Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS195/1 (May 31, 2000).
343
Retreaded Tyres, supra note 332.
339
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DS 339, 340 & 342: China—Measures Affecting Imports of
Automobile Parts344
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TP
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F. General Market Access
In this category, I grouped cases involving familiar forms of protectionism,
such as minimum import pricing, as well as cases that did not readily fit into an
industry-specific grouping. The vast majority of the cases are both Trade
Positive and Investment Positive. This should come as no surprise because
general market access restrictions are the key aspects of protectionism. In fact,
this category includes only one Trade Negative case: Japan—Measures
Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper.345 This case reflected a deep
trade tension between Japan—whose economy had been export-oriented since
after World War II—and the U.S., which sought to gain greater access to the
Japanese market after its remarkable solidification.346 The U.S. claimed Japan
was taking protective measures to defend Fuji, its local photographic film and
paper manufacturer.347 The Panel found that none of the Japanese measures were
improper.348 However, an arbitrator may cut through the traditionally protective
market access structure of Japan and rule in favor of a complainant similarly
situated to Kodak, the American photographic film manufacturer. I have,
therefore, classified this case as an Investment Potentially Positive filing.

344
Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WTO Doc.
WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (adopted Dec. 15, 2008).
345
Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc.
WT/DS44/R (adopted Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Photographic Film and Paper].
346
Id.; Wenyu Zang & Mark Baimbridge, Exports, Imports and Economic Growth in South Korea and
Japan: A Tale of Two Economies, 44 APPLIED ECON. 361, 362 (2012); Patrick Christy, America’s Proud History
of Post-War Aid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 6, 2014), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2014/06/06/the-lessons-from-us-aid-after-world-war-ii.
347
Photographic Film and Paper, supra note 345.
348
Id.
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DS 44: Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper349
DS 431, 432 & 433 China—Measures Related to the
Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum350
DS 116: Brazil—Measures Affecting Payment Terms for
Imports351
DS 137: European Communities—Measures Affecting
Imports of Wood of Conifers from Canada352
DS 149: India—Import Restrictions353
DS 188: Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from
Colombia and Honduras354
DS 197: Brazil—Measures on Minimum Import Prices355
DS 198: Romania—Measures on Minimum Import
Prices356
DS 201: Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from
Colombia and Honduras357
DS 233: Argentina—Measures Affecting the Import of
Pharmaceutical Products358
DS 246: European Communities—Tariff Preferences359
DS 358 & 359: China—Measures Concerning Refunds,
Reductions or Exemptions from Certain Taxes and Other
Payments360
349
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Id.
Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014).
351
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil—Measures Affecting Payment Terms
for Imports, WTO Doc. WT/DS116/1 (Jan. 13, 1998).
352
Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—Measures Affecting Imports of Wood
of Conifers from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS137/1 (June 24, 1998).
353
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, India—Import Restrictions, WTO Doc.
WT/DS149/1 (Nov. 12, 1998).
354
Request for Consultations by Colombia, Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and
Colombia, WTO Doc. WT/DS188/1 (Jan. 20, 2000).
355
Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures on Minimum Import Prices, WTO
Doc. WT/DS197/1 (June 7, 2000).
356
Request for Consultations by the United States, Romania—Measures on Minimum Import Prices, WTO
Doc. WT/DS198/1 (June 8, 2000).
357
Request for Consultations by Honduras, Nicaragua—Measures Affecting Imports from Honduras and
Colombia, WTO Doc. WT/DS201/1 (June 13, 2000).
358
Request for Consultations by India, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Import of Pharmaceutical
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS233/1 (May 30, 2001).
359
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004).
360
Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures Granting Refunds,
Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, WTO Doc. WT/DS358/1 (Feb. 7, 2007).
350
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DS 421: Moldova—Measures Affecting the Importation
and Internal Sale of Goods361
DS 438, 444, 445 & 446: Argentina—Measures Affecting
the Importation of Goods362
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G. Textiles
I grouped under this heading all textiles cases raising a substantial Article III
or Article XI concern. The cases discussed here reflect domestic efforts to
protect growing textiles industries or, in some cases, to resist the textile
production outsourcing to more cost-effective jurisdictions that have
characterized the industry. Not surprisingly, these cases are all Trade Positive—
Investment Positive filings.
The outcomes of these cases are summarized in the table below:
DS 29, 34 & 47: Turkey—Restriction on the Import of
Textiles and Clothing Products363

TP

IP

DS 90, 91, 92, 93, 94 & 96: India—Quantitative Restrictions
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products364

TP

IP

361
Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Moldova—Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal
Sale of Goods (Environmental Charge), WTO Doc. WT/DS421/1 (Feb. 21, 2011).
362
Appellate Body Report, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WTO Doc.
WT/DS438/AB/R, WT/DS444/AB/R, WT/DS445/AB/R (adopted Jan. 1, 2015); Request for Consultations by
Mexico, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WTO Doc. WT/DS446/1 (Aug. 29, 2012).
363
Appellate Body Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS34/AB/R (adopted Oct. 22, 1999); Request for Consultations by Thailand, Turkey—Restrictions on
Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS47/1 (June 26, 1996); Communication from the
European Communities, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS29/2 (Mar. 1, 1996).
364
Appellate Body Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/AB/R (adopted Aug. 23, 1999); Request for Consultations by the
European Communities, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS96/1 (July 24, 1997); Request for Consultations by Switzerland, India—
Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS94/1
(July 23, 1997); Appellate Body Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile
and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS91/AB/R (adopted July 22, 1997); Request for Consultations by
Canada, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO
Doc. WT/DS92/1 (July 22, 1997); Request for Consultations by New Zealand, India—Quantitative Restrictions
on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS93/1 (July 22, 1997).
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DS 151: United States—Measures Affecting Textiles and
Apparel Products (II)365

517

TP

IP

DS 196: Argentina—Measures Affecting the Import of
Pharmaceutical Products, Request for Consultation366

TP

IP

DS 183: Brazil—Measures on Import Licensing and Minimum
Import Prices367

TP

IP

TP

IP

TP

IP

DS 451: China—Measures Related to the Production and
Exportation of Apparel and Textiles368
DS 366: Colombia—Ports of Entry—Panama Colón Free
Zone369

H. Intellectual Property
I grouped under this heading the cases involving national treatment, Article
XI of the GATT, SPS, or TBT claims related to intellectual property protection
of foreign products.370 Excluding cases involving public health
considerations,371 I classified these cases as Trade Positive—Investment
Positive.
The outcomes of the Intellectual Property cases are outlined in the table
below:

365
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—Measures Affecting Textiles
and Apparel Products (II), WTO Doc. WT/DS151/1 (Nov. 25, 1998).
366
Request for Consultations by India, Argentina—Measures Affecting the Import of Pharmaceutical
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS233/1 (May 30, 2001).
367
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil—Measures on Import Licensing and
Minimum Import Prices, WTO Doc. WT/DS183/1 (Oct. 25, 1999).
368
Request for Consultations by Mexico, China—Measures Relating to the Production and Exportation
of Apparel and Textile Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS451/1 (Oct. 18, 2012).
369
Panel Report, Colombia—Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Port of Entry, WTO Doc.
WT/DS366/R (adopted Apr. 27, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Colombia—Indicative Prices and Restrictions Panel
Report].
370
I have not included the “pure” TRIPS cases (i.e., those that arise only in connection with a claimed
failure to adhere to a State’s intellectual property obligations but do not implicate the trade provisions discussed
in this Article). I will address those cases in the sequel to this Article. Also, I have classified the plain packaging
case as a Cigarettes and Related Products Case even though it could just as easily qualify as an Intellectual
Property Case.
371
See infra notes 367, 369.
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DS 174: European Communities—Protection of Trademarks
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs372

TP

IP

DS 199: Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection373

TP

IPP

DS 224: United States—US Patents Code374

TP

IP

DS 434, 435 & 441: Australia—Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products375

TP

IPP

DS 290: European Communities—Protection of Trademarks
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs376

TP

IP

TP

IP

DS 186: United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
and Amendments Thereto377

I. Periodicals, Films, and Other Cultural Products
I loosely labeled and categorized these cases as “Cultural Cases.” I have, as
an operational rule, assumed that my IT will be interpreted with special
deference to cultural industries. Therefore, any case in this section that would
otherwise be Investment Positive has been downgraded to Potentially Positive.
372
Panel Report, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs—Complaint by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS174/R (adopted Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter
European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications].
373
Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WTO
Doc. WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000).
374
Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States—US Patents Code, WTO Doc. WT/DS224/1 (July
2, 2001).
375
Communication from the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS434/15 (Oct.
27, 2014); Communication from the Panel, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks,
Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/19 (Oct. 22 2014); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Honduras,
Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/16 (Oct. 17, 2012).
376
Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs—Complaint by Australia, WTO Doc. WT/DS290/R, (adopted Mar. 15,
2005) [hereinafter 2005 Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs].
377
Request for Consultations by the European Communities and their member States, United States—
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Amendments Thereto, WTO Doc. WT/DS186/1 (Jan. 18, 2000).
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DS 31: Canada—Measures Concerning Periodicals378

TP

IPP

DS 43: Turkey—Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues379

TP

IPP

DS 363: China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products380

TP

IPP

J. Embargoes
This category includes a single case: a filing challenging the United States’
secondary embargo targeting companies engaged in certain commercial
activities with Cuba:
DS 38: United States—The Cuban Democracy and Solidarity Act.381
The case is interesting because, in an era where international strategic
considerations include a strong emphasis on economic sanctions (as the Iran
nuclear issue demonstrates) and when allies do not necessarily agree completely
on tactics, the issues that it presents may well recur. This case qualifies as a
Trade Positive and an Investment Potentially Positive filing because the United
States’ measure will likely violate Article XI as it potentially breaches principles
of customary international law.382 The WTO may find a ban on imports not
justified by any valid domestic purpose. An arbitral tribunal may lend a
sympathetic ear and award damages for sales lost as a result of the secondary
embargo and other causally related damages. However, the national security
justification for the measure may deter the tribunal from intervening; for this
reason, this case is an Investment Potentially Positive.

378
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc.
WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted June 30, 1997).
379
Request for Consultations by the United States, Turkey—Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues, WTO
Doc. WT/DS435/1 (June 17, 1996).
380
Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21,
2009).
381
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1 (Mar. 13, 1996).
382
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1 (May 13, 1996); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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K. Asbestos
I included the famed Asbestos case in this category. The Appellate Body in
this case dismissed the NT claim,383 and an investment tribunal would have
probably reached the same conclusion. It is therefore a Trade Negative and
Investment Negative case.384
L. Technology Products
I included cases involving high-tech products in this category. They raise
issues of competition and market access similar to those discussed in both the
General Market Access and the Commodities, Energy, and Raw Materials
categories. As in the General Market Access, one case was classified as
Investment Potentially Positive because of the possible public health concerns,
while the other two are both Trade Positive—Investment Positive:
DS 15: Japan—Measures Affecting the Purchase of
Telecommunications Equipment385
DS 291, 292 & 293: European Communities—Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products386
DS 309: China—Value–Added Tax on Integrated
Circuits387

TP

IP

TP

IPP

TP

IP

M. Commodities, Energy, and Raw Materials
The history of trade and the WTO mirrors that of the trading nations’
economies and their interactions.388 One of the stories told by the cases in this
subject matter category is that of the expansion of manufacturing to China, India,
and other new economic powerhouses, the relationship of interdependence
between these states and the traditional players in global trade, and the live
383
Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/1 (June 3, 1998).
384
Id.
385
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Japan—Measures Affecting the Purchase of
Telecommunications Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS15/1 (Aug. 24, 1995).
386
Panel Reports, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (adopted Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter 2006
European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products].
387
Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits,
WT/DS309/1 (Mar. 23, 2004).
388
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Japan—Measures Affecting the Purchase of
Telecommunications Equipment, WTO Doc. WT/DS15/1 (Aug. 24, 1995).
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application of rational choice theory. Take, for example, the rare earths case
pitting China against Western states,389 discussed in the General Market Access
section above. Rare earths are necessary to a wide array of key products.390
China’s restriction of raw material exports has the obvious effect of forcing
foreign manufacturers to set up shop in China to have access to such raw
materials. At the same time, as they seek to limit their losses to China’s
manufacturing strength and to penetrate its thickly protected markets, the United
States and European nations are engaged in violations of their own—and are
being taken to task by China.391 Their consumer-hungry societies are also being
fed by China-bought credit and their currencies by China-held debt.392 The
constant theme, as demonstrated by the review of hundreds of WTO cases in this
Article, is that the WTO will seek to root out protectionism. Based on my
understanding of the history of trade and the constant drives that propel it
forward, I have not hesitated to classify cases in these areas that involve
protectionism or other unjustified measures as Trade Positives. The absence of
domestic countervailing purposes has, by and large, prompted me to predict
Investment Positive outcomes:393
DS 1: Malaysia—Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and
Polypropylene394
DS 387, 388, 390, 394, 395 & 398: China—Measures Related
to the Exportation of Raw Materials395

TP

IP

TP

IP

389
Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and
Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS531/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014).
390
U.S.G.S., THE RARE-EARTH ELEMENTS – VITAL TO MODERN TECHNOLOGIES AND LIFESTYLES (Nov.
2014).
391
See, e.g., Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., China Launches Solar Case Against E.U. at WTO,
16 BRIDGES WEEKLY 4, 5 (2012) (describing “tit for tat” nature of China’s filing against E.U.). See generally
Matthew C. Turk, Why Does the Complainant Always Win at the WTO?: A Reputation-Based Theory of
Litigation at the Word Trade Organization, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 385 (2011) (applying rational choice
theory to explain states’ selection of largely meritorious cases advancing national interests).
392
Yu Yongding, Overcome the Fear of RMB Appreciation, in CHINA AND THE WORLD: BALANCE AND
IMBALANCE 217–34 (Binhong SHAO, ed., Leiden 2013). China has accumulated $350 billion worth of foreign
exchange reserves and lent that amount to the United States. Id.
393
See infra, notes 394–99. One case was downgraded to Investment Potentially Positive—DS 456:
India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules. See infra, note 399. This case is a Trade
Positive and Investment Potentially Positive because it raises claims of performance requirements, which may
or may not be exempted from a BIT under procurement exemptions.
394
Request for Consultations under Article XXIII.1 of the GATT 1994 by Singapore, Malaysia—
Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and Polypropylene, WTO Doc. WT/DS1/1 (Jan. 13, 1995).
395
Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/1 (June 25, 2009).
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DS 426: Canada—Measures Related to the Feed-In Tariff
Program396
DS 431, 432 & 433: China—Export, Quotas, Duties and
Other Restrictions on Rare Earths397
DS 452: China—Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector398
DS 456: India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and
Solar Modules399

[Vol. 32

TP

IP

TP

IP

TP

IP

TP

IPP

CONCLUSION
My review of WTO filings gave me a new flavor of the historical evolution
of trade. I was struck by how many cases came down as Trade Positive without
much of an analytical controversy. This was perhaps my biggest surprise on the
trade side. I expected to find a strong trade-investment correlation, but not that
it would translate into a wholesale capture of trade filings on account of an
overwhelming number of Trade Positive cases. I obtain the same results in the
sequel to this piece, including as they relate to anti-dumping and other measures
that I have not reviewed here but that have a profound impact on trade law. My
findings illustrate that it is meaningless to attempt to define a boundary
distinguishing between goods and investments. A baker sells bread through a
bakery. Any regulation affecting the bread will obviously impact the baker and
the bakery. The implications of these findings will be examined in a separate
paper. For now, it is sufficient to emphasize that states cannot simply assume
that their obligations to the self-contained system of the WTO end there. The
constantly emerging role of investment arbitrations against states requires them
to calculate their steps more carefully than in the past. Conversely, investment
lawyers should also be aware of the attack on trade. While the WTO’s selfcontained system may have legitimacy because of its limits, the investment
system may lose its legitimacy if it achieves outcomes that may exceed the
legitimate reach of international economic law in relation to sovereign
regulatory space, as it is currently at risk of doing.

396
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WTO Doc.
WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013).
397
Appellate Body Reports, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and
Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014).
398
Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States—Certain Measures
Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS452/1 (Nov. 7, 2012).
399
Appellate Body Report, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO
Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Sept. 16, 2016).

